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To Be Seen But Not Heard: How the
Internet’s Negative Impact on
Minors’ Constitutional Right to
Privacy, Speech, and Autonomy
Creates a Need for
Empathy-By-Design
Jon M. Garon*
I. ABSTRACT
This Article reviews the rights of individuals younger than eighteen
to engage in their daily activities, now often mediated through online
service providers, learning management systems, and other
technological intermediaries. Unlike prior generations, modern
adolescents must navigate the complex world of online society in
addition to their family life, school day, and the time they spend away
from school at work or in social activities.
This project includes concerns over bullying and harassment,
contractual rights, social media policies, child pornography laws,
revenge pornography laws, and end-user license agreements.
Neither sectoral privacy laws nor state privacy laws address the
complex problems adolescents face in the online sphere. The landscape
is such that the average teen spends much of the waking day online—a
virtual existence that provides little anonymity and that leaves them
vulnerable to predation and harsh consequences of their own mistakes.
Parents are legally expected to be the primary authority for these teens’
Professor of Law and Director, Intellectual Property, Cybersecurity, and Technology Law
Program, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law. University of
Minnesota (B.A., 1985), Columbia Law School (J.D. 1988). Member, State Bar of
California, Minnesota, and New Hampshire. The Author wishes to thank the University
of Budapest Privacy Forum for the discussion forum on an earlier version of this paper.
*

463

464

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

upbringing and well-being, but the online competition often makes this
a challenge. Parents and other authorities lack relevant knowledge to
help the digital generation deal with this array of online issues.
Against this backdrop, many parents and states have turned to
schools to regulate teen conduct. In response, the Supreme Court of the
United States stated that the parent’s traditional authority remains
central, suggesting that while the schools have a role to play in loco
parentis, the parents and guardians have primary responsibility. This is
particularly true for online, off-campus speech. The cautious guidance
provided by the Supreme Court will continue to pressure school
districts and other state regulators to fashion practices to address these
challenges.
This Article reviews the Supreme Court’s school-speech
jurisprudence within the larger context of online speech and conduct
regulation for minors, including minors’ right to access information, to
create their own content, including sexual content, to transact online,
and to obtain an abortion. In many of these activities, minors are
barred, subjected to parental consent, or required to seek a judicial
alternative to parental consent. By looking both in and beyond the
schoolhouse, this Article will identify the constitutionally required
protections for minors of various ages, providing a framework for
assessing the constitutionality of new state laws.
II. INTRODUCTION
Tell me is my voice too loud
A grating sound piercing the beautiful silence:
Children should be seen and not heard
Compliant and quiet, empty husks for your indoctrination
For your prescription
For your fear of subversion
—Angel Xing1
At the most global and abstract level, the fate of children has
improved in this century. For example, in 1980, “10 percent of the
children born that year died from preventable causes. By 2018, that

1. Angel Xing, If You Cut Us, Do We Not Bleed?, YORK COMMUNITIES FOR PUBLIC
COMMUNITIES
FOR
PUBLIC
EDUCATION
(Feb.
4,
2020),
https://www.yorkcommunitiesfored.ca/angel_xing_poem. Performance of the full spoken
word
poem
can
be
found
at
https://www.rogerstv.com/show?lid=12&rid=79&sid=8017&gid=325774
(beginning
at
23:00).
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number had declined to just 3 percent.”2 Today, United Nations
International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) focuses primarily
on malnutrition and basic medicines. While the global outlook for
children has improved, severe risks remain. UNICEF reported that “[i]n
2018, almost 200 million children under [the age of] 5 suffered from
stunting or wasting while at least 340 million suffered from hidden
hunger.”3 Thankfully, most of the world’s children receive the nutrition
and shelter they need. Children, however, need much more.
Adolescence is the pivotal period between childhood and
adulthood . . . . [Y]outh need to acquire the attitudes, competencies,
values, and social skills that will carry them forward to successful
adulthood. It is also the time when they need to avoid choices and
behaviors that will limit their future potential.4

Adolescents,5 the rising generation of leaders, are a potent force in
the global economy. The family is the fundamental and universal
organizing principle of society, and parents are responsible for the
education and well-being of their children. Article 16 of the United
Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that “[t]he
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State.”6 In the United States,
parental rights are considered fundamental rights that cannot be
2. The
State
of
the
World’s
Children,
UNICEF
(Oct.
2021),
https://www.unicef.org/reports/state-of-worlds-children.
3. The State of the World’s Children 2019: Children, Food, and Nutrition, UNICEF
(2019),
https://www.unicef.org/media/106506/file/The%20State%20of%20the%20World%E2%80%
99s%20Children%202019.pdf.
4. National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, Community Programs to
Promote Youth Development, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE AND NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 1
(2002), https://doi.org/10.17226/10022.
5. Throughout the paper, the terms adolescent, child, minor, and teen are used to
reflect individuals younger than eighteen years of age. The age of majority is eighteen in
all states except Alabama and Nebraska, which set the age at nineteen, and Mississippi,
which sets the age at twenty-one. See Elissa Suh, The Age of Majority (and the UTMA
Account Distribution Age) in Every State, POLICYGENIUS (Dec. 30, 2020),
https://www.policygenius.com/estate-planning/age-of-majority-by-state/.
Adolescents
generally refers to minors under the age of eighteen; however, the World Health
Organization (WHO) defines an adolescent as any person between ages ten and nineteen.
See Orientation Programme on Adolescent Health for Health Care Providers, WHO (2012),
https://www.who.int/maternal_child_adolescent/documents/pdfs/9241591269_op_handout.
pdf.
6. U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble (Dec. 10, 1948). See
Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National
and International Law, 25 GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 287, 289 (1996).
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usurped by state authority without a compelling state need.7 “Yet at
least 25 percent of adolescents in the United States are at serious risk
of not achieving ‘productive adulthood’ and face such risks as substance
abuse, adolescent pregnancy, school failure, and involvement with the
juvenile justice system.”8
Familial rights often interfere with the rights of the minor,
reassigning a substantial amount of individual autonomy from the
minor to the minor’s parents. In conflicts between the parents’ rights
and the children’s rights, legal doctrine is inconsistent regarding
parents’ fundamental rights to make decisions on behalf of their
children and the rights of children to make their own decisions.
Nowhere are these conflicts greater than in the related areas of privacy
and speech. As a result of this historical tension, the legal fiction of the
minor is used to retain a body of law that does not respect the minor’s
autonomy, nor does it adequately reflect the tension between minors
and their parents or guardians. Minors express their autonomy in
several ways. They enter contracts, participate in education, engage in
public speech of political and social natures, and have sex—which
means that many seek contraceptive services, and some seek abortions.
This Article explores the many ways adolescents express their
autonomy despite authority vested in their parents and guardians, in
their schools, and in the state. As described in this Article, struggles for
autonomy have become more difficult and complex due to the
occasionally hostile and demeaning experience teens face online.
After reviewing the teen struggles for autonomy, this Article
identifies specific counterproductive efforts in helping minors develop
into healthy, productive adults. Specifically, this Article suggests that
expanded school authority to punish students for antisocial behavior is
ineffective at resolving the problems faced by teens. It also suggests
that the rights and interests of teens in their own sexual activity should
serve to limit certain instances where child pornography laws are used
to punish individuals for their own sexual activities that do not involve
adult predators.
Rather than finding the situation intractable and current solutions
ineffective, however, this Article concludes with a prescription for how
best to create a healthier environment for teen development and
growth. Using the principles of “empathy-by-design,” this Article
suggests that a combination of steps can be undertaken to improve the
environment for teen development. These include bringing advertisers,
financiers, and other enablers of social media to help prioritize the end
7. See infra Section II.
8. Community Programs to Promote Youth Development, supra note 4, at 2.
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to online harassment, the development of empathy-based humancentered design principles into the school setting, expanding restorative
justice practices, and teaching the skills and science behind empathy to
make empathy-based problem solving the standard for teen
development and institutional processes. Only by moving from a rightsbased approach to an empathy-based model will the communal goals of
raising healthy, well-adjusted, and productive teens be met.
II. THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF PARENTS OVER THEIR CHILDREN
The United Nations has recognized both the rights of parents and
guardians. In both the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child,9 and
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child,10 the United Nations
emphasized the role of parents and guardians as the gatekeepers for
child welfare. The Preamble to the Convention includes the following
statement regarding families: “Convinced that the family, as the
fundamental group of society and the national environment for the
growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children,
should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it
can fully assume its responsibilities within the community[.]”11
The rights of a parent have long been established as a fundamental
part of domestic law and a foundational component of natural law.12
“The parent, by natural law, is entitled to the custody and care of the
child[.]”13 This right comes with certain duties and limitations imposed
by the state.
To society, organized as a state, it is a matter of paramount interest
that the child shall be cared for, and that the duties of support and
education be performed by the parent or guardian, in order that the
child shall become a healthful and useful member of the
community.14

“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of

9. U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959). See generally Roger J.R.
Levesque, The Internationalization of Children’s Human Rights: Too Radical for
American Adolescents?, 9 CONN. J. INTL. L. 237, 293 (1994).
10. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990). The United States has signed
the convention but has yet to send the treaty to the Senate for ratification.
11. Id. (emphasis in original).
12. People v. Ewer, 36 N.E. 4, 5 (N.Y. 1894).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”15 Unless
there is a conflict, the child’s legal rights are generally safeguarded by
protecting the interests of the child’s parents or legal guardians.16
“[P]arents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.”17
Parents are obligated to take care of their children, yet one-third of
children in the U.S. do not live in two-parent homes.18 The biological
parents are presumed to be the custodians of their children without the
need to demonstrate their ability to raise children or prove that their
parenting is in the child’s best interests.19 The family is a universal
component of most societies, and the parents possess the presumptive
role for directing the family unit.20 The Supreme Court of the United
States, for example, has recognized the parental right to choose
language education over the objection of state law;21 to participate in
religious rather than secular education;22 and “[t]he rights of children to
exercise their religion, and of parents to give them religious training
and to encourage them in the practice of religious belief[.]”23
Many local school districts, however, make parental participation in
public schools an ongoing challenge as parents strive to balance their
choices about their children’s education with the choices made by the
school district.24 Caught in the middle of this tension are the wishes and
interests of the children themselves. In Prince v. Massachusetts, for
example, the Supreme Court addressed the right of a parent to compel

15. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
16. Id.
17. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
18. Youth Statistics: Family Structure and Relationships, ACT FOR YOUTH
http://actforyouth.net/adolescence/demographics/family.cfm (last visited Jan. 21, 2022)
(citing America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2018: Children (C table series), U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (2018), http://census.gov/data/tables/2018/demo/families/cps-2018.html
(last visited Jan. 21, 2022)).
19. See, e.g., U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 10, at Art. 3.2
(“State Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for
his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her . . . .”).
20. The complex and evolving understanding of family, as defined by law, is beyond
the scope of this Article. See generally Martha Minow, Forming Underneath Everything
That Grows: Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819 (1985).
21. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (holding that Latin, Greek, and
Hebrew are not proscribed; but, German, French, Spanish, Italian, and every other alien
speech are within the ban).
22. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
23. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
24. See Minow, supra note 20, at 833.
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or permit a minor to sell periodicals or engage in other street vending.25
In addition to barring boys under twelve and girls under eighteen from
various forms of street vending,26 the law also singled out parents—but
not children—for punishment under the law:
Any parent, guardian or custodian having a minor under his control
who compels or permits such minor to work in violation [of the
act] . . . shall for a first offence be punished by a fine of not less than
two nor more than ten dollars or by imprisonment for not more than
five days, or both[.]27

Nine-year-old Betty Simmons, the Court explained, cried until her
guardian, Sarah Prince, relented and allowed Betty and Mrs. Prince’s
two other children to join her. Together they stood on a downtown
street corner preaching and promoting publications central to the
Jehovah’s Witness’s religious practices.28 The Court acknowledged that
the activities were protected under the First Amendment, and had the
law prohibited all persons from selling the religious texts, the law
would have been unconstitutional.29 Nonetheless, since the religious
publications were considered for sale to the passersby, the streetvending law was implicated, and the Court found that the state had an
interest stronger than that of the parents in enforcing the ordinance.30
“The state’s authority over children’s activities is broader than over like
actions of adults.”31
[T]he mere fact a state could not wholly prohibit this form of adult
activity, whether characterized locally as a ‘sale’ or otherwise, does
not mean it cannot do so for children. Such a conclusion granted
would mean that a state could impose no greater limitation upon
child labor than upon adult labor. Or, if an adult were free to enter
dance halls, saloons, and disreputable places generally, in order to
discharge his conceived religious duty to admonish or dissuade
persons from frequenting such places, so would be a child with

25. Prince, 321 U.S. at 160–61 (“No boy under twelve and no girl under eighteen shall
sell, expose or offer for sale any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any other articles
of merchandise of any description, or exercise the trade of bootblack or scavenger, or any
other trade, in any street or public place.”).
26. See id. The law in question under Prince would violate the Equal Protection
Clause due to its gender disparities, an issue not before the Court in 1944.
27. Id. at 161.
28. Id. at 161–62.
29. Id. at 167–68.
30. Id. at 168.
31. Id.
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similar convictions and objectives, if not alone then in the parent’s
company, against the state’s command.32

Prince illustrates a judicial tolerance for regulations of minors and
the access to various rights using age as a criterion. Age restrictions on
driving automobiles33 and voting34 are other examples. A minor cannot
undertake certain categories of work as determined by the Fair Labor
Standards Act,35 and laws in various states,36 nor may a minor draft a
will.37 Finally, under common law doctrine, for example, a minor cannot
enter a binding contract, making most consensual arrangements with a
minor voidable.38
States impose these limitations on minors for a variety of reasons. As
illustrated by the common law contract doctrine, the voidability rule is
intended to protect the minor from both the minor’s decisions and the
predatory nature of commerce.39
The reason for allowing the minor the privilege of voiding his
contracts was the protection of the minor. It was thought that the
minor was immature in both mind and experience; therefore, he

32. Id.
33. See generally, Driver’s Licenses in the United States, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Driver%27s_licenses_in_the_United_States (collecting stateby-state standards) (last visited Sept. 26, 2021).
34. See V. Nathaniel Ang, Teenage Employment Emancipation and the Law, 9 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 389 (2007) (“Teenagers have limited rights in the United States. The
minimum driving age is sixteen in most states. The minimum full working age is
eighteen, when teenagers are legally allowed to work in any occupation. The minimum
voting age is eighteen.”).
35. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.125 (2015). See Dana M. Dohn & Amy Pimer, Child Labor
Laws and the Impossibility of Statutory Emancipation, 33 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 121,
166 (2015).
36. See
generally,
Hazardous
Jobs,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/youthlabor/hazardousjobs (providing links state labor
offices/state laws) (last visited Sept. 4, 2021).
37. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (amended 2019) (“An individual 18 or more years of
age who is of sound mind may make a will.”). There are two states with statutory
exceptions. See Mark Glover, Rethinking the Testamentary Capacity of Minors, 79 MO. L.
REV. 69, 117 (2014) (The two exceptions are Georgia and Louisiana. O.C.G.A § 53-4-10
(authorizing children ages fourteen and older to execute a will); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
1476 (authorizing children ages sixteen and older to execute a will)).
38. See Juanda Lowder Daniel, Virtually Mature: Examining the Policy of Minors’
Incapacity to Contract Through the Cyberscope, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 239, 244 (2008); Larry A.
DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the “Infancy Law Doctrine”: From Incapacity to
Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481, 485 (1994).
39. Robert G. Edge, Voidability of Minors’ Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine in a Modern
Economy, 1 GA. L. REV. 205 (1967).

2022

TO BE SEEN BUT NOT HEARD

471

should be protected from his own bad judgment as well as from
adults who would take advantage of him. There can be little dispute
with the reasoning behind this purpose.40

The voidability doctrine for minors’ contracts dates back to the
fifteenth century. “General education was not in existence, commerce
was limited to Guilds, membership in which was restricted, industry as
we know it today was not yet born; no opportunity was afforded for the
foundation of an experience pattern in business transactions of even the
simplest nature.”41 Given this set of assumptions about the ability of
minors to understand their economic choices, the protective law seems
appropriate. After all, “[s]uch children were untutored in the wiles of
commerce and therefore easy prey for a designing and crafty adult.”42
Still, since their adult counterparts had little more education, the
distinction might be overstated.
Professor Martha Minow challenged the notion that the common law
rules regarding women’s domestic roles in the nineteenth century were
merely descriptive, propounding instead that the common law served
“as one set of ideas and practices influencing and influenced by social
life.”43 The same is likely true for the law of minors, particularly since
more pernicious paternalistic aspects of state law impinge on the rights
of female minors.44 Professor Minow and others also have described how
many of these laws are narrowed remnants of nineteenth-century
patriarchal legal systems.45 The state provided the male head of the
household “property, contract, and suffrage rights; excluded his wife
and children from such rights; and accorded him powers over the
property and services of his wife and children, along with powers to
discipline them.”46 The law’s treatment of wives as subordinate and
sublimated to their husbands extended to that of their children.47 “The
same protective justification accompanied traditional legal disabilities

40. Id. at 205 (quoting James L. Sivil, Jr., Contracts–Capacity of the Older Minor, 30
U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 230, 230 (1962)).
41. Clark Miller, Fraudulent Misrepresentations of Age As Affecting the Infant’s
Contracts-A Comparative Study, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 73, 74 (1953).
42. Id.
43. Minow, supra note 20, at 822.
44. See infra Section III.
45. Minow, supra note 20, at 828.
46. Id.; see I. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 433–36
(1822).
47. Minow, supra note 20, at 828.
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applied to children and exempted them from responsible control of
property, contractual relations, and criminal acts.”48
Modern minors find themselves in a particularly unique situation.
“Online markets are increasingly dependent on minors.”49 The common
law rules on contract disaffirmance remain firmly in place, yet every
app on a smartphone, every video game, and most websites require
users to sign terms-of-service agreements (or end-user-license
agreements).50 Minors are often provided free games and services with
in-app opportunities to purchase new features or in-game assets.51
Everyone does, but few people read them.52 “A Deloitte survey of 2,000
consumers in the U.S. found that 91% of people consent to legal terms
and services conditions without reading them. For younger people, ages
18–34 the rate is even higher with 97% agreeing to conditions before
reading.”53 In the academic setting, an important decision involving
anti-plagiarism software elided over the disaffirmance issue by
applying a copyright fair use analysis to give the software company the
needed authority to archive copies of the student papers.54
In the environment of amusement parks, Six Flags was found to have
failed to meet the requirement under the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act when it used fingerprint technology for park passes.55 The
minors who attended the park were incapable of meeting the waiver
requirements upon which the company was relying to employ its
biometric passes, and therefore there was no statutorily acceptable
consent to the collection of the information.56 In 2014, the ease with

48. Minow, supra note 20, at 829; Edge, supra note 39.
49. Cheryl B. Preston, Cyberinfants, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 225, 228 (2012).
50. See id. at 226. (“Providers of such ‘free’ web services do so intending to recover
their costs and make significant profit from advertisements and other monetized
features.”).
51. See, e.g., Doe v. Epic Games, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
(“Fortnite . . . can be downloaded at no cost but allows players to make ‘in-App purchases’
using virtual currency called ‘V-Bucks,’ which can be earned through game play or
purchased for money.”).
52. See Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service
Agreements, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/deloittestudy-91-percent-agree-terms-of-service-without-reading-2017-11.
53. Id.
54. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 633, 637–38 (4th Cir.
2009) (permitting iParadigm’s Turn-it-In software to archive student papers without
either student or parental consent). See Preston, supra note 49, at 235–36.
55. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1206–07 (Ill. 2019).
56. Id. at 1206 (“The Act vests in individuals and customers the right to control their
biometric information by requiring notice before collection and giving them the power to
say no by withholding consent.”).
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which minors could use their parents’ phones to make in-app purchases
led to an FTC settlement by Apple.57 A similar action led to a summary
judgment action against Amazon for failing to address in-app purchases
by minors who could easily buy game benefits without parental
consent.58
There have been surprisingly few disaffirmance class action suits,
but that may change. Given the tremendous economic interest in
collecting funds from minors, the pressure will then mount to restrict
the rights of disaffirmance. In the alternative, in-app purchases may—
and indeed should—require more meaningful consent from parents or
guardians.59 But while in-app purchases capture the attention of the
FTC, waivers of privacy, rights of publicity, copyright, and other
interests are all being lost by minors to these opaque terms-of-service
agreements with little regard to the policies underlying contractual
disaffirmance. The lack of disaffirmance protections empowers minors
to contract, but the structure of clickwrap agreements means that the
adolescents may not be aware of the consequences of these contracts.60
In his essay On Liberty, John Stuart Mill asserted that “the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”61
This assertion of liberty, however, ignores the liberty interests of the
minor which are held either by the parent or by the state. Yet
57. See Apple Inc. Will Provide Full Consumer Refunds of At Least $32.5 Million to
Settle FTC Complaint It Charged for Kids’ In-App Purchases Without Parental Consent,
FTC (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/apple-incwill-provide-full-consumer-refunds-least-325-million.
58. F.T.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 71 F.Supp.3d 1158, 1165 (W.D. Wash. 2014). Amazon
unsuccessfully argued that the minors had “apparent authority” to purchase items, but
the court deflected this claim, stating “[t]he Court notes that it is not inclined to extend
apparent authority to child users without more persuasive legal authority.” Id.
59. See, e.g., Emily Guy Birken and Dia Adams, Real Money for Virtual Gems: What
to
Do
When
Kids
Overspend
on
Apps,
FORBES
(Dec.
9,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/advisor/credit-cards/real-money-for-virtual-gems-what-to-dowhen-kids-overspend-on-apps/.
60. See Katy Hull, The Overlooked Concern with the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1391, 1406 (2000) (“[T]he act of the minor clicking a
button which asserts competency to enter into a contract will not remove the consumer
protections which allow the minor to disaffirm.”). See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN,
BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013)
(describing the degradation of meaningful consent in clickwrap and similar online
agreements); Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627,
635 (2002); Steven W. Feldman, Mutual Assent, Normative Degradation, and Mass
Market Standard Form Contracts-A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print,
Vanishing Rights and the Rule of Law (Part i), 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 399 (2014).
61. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 1, 13 (1859).
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compulsory education and truancy laws are designed to tell the child
that the state has the final say in the child’s best interests. The
Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration established a national goal of
school attendance, explaining in a 1935 report that “[t]he ideal of
having all the children of elementary and secondary school age (6 to 17,
inclusive) attend school has not been attained.”62 The Roosevelt
Administration promoted the government’s interest in enforcing
truancy laws “in the faith that education is essential to the perpetuity
of popular government and social justice.”63 In doing so, the government
supplanted the parents, emphasizing that the family’s economic needs
for child labor or other objections to universal education must take a
backseat to the government’s interest in its citizenry. Truancy laws
offered no possibility that the minor had any personal stake in the
decision to participate in the decision to attend school.
To a lesser degree, parental control over a child’s health care has also
been usurped by state interests. In Jacobson v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts,64 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld
Massachusetts’ mandatory vaccinations, allowing exceptions based on
medical issues.65 All states have continued to enforce similar laws.66 In
addition to medical exemptions, almost all states provide religious
exemptions for mandatory vaccination of children.67 Beyond
vaccinations, states can intervene when a parent refuses to permit
lifesaving medical treatment,68 or when child neglect or abuse is

62. WALTER DEFENBAUGH & WARD KEESECKER, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR,
COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE LAWS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION 1 (1935), available
at https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED542358.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
63. Id. at 311.
64. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
65. Id. at 26.
66. See Alan R. Hinman et al., Childhood Immunization: Laws That Work, 30 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 122, 124–25 (2002).
67. Id. at 124 (“Forty-eight states currently allow religious exemptions, and sixteen
permit philosophical exemptions. Additionally, Arizona and Missouri allow philosophical
exemptions in some settings.”).
68. Emily G. Narum, Making the Grade: School-Based Telemedicine and Parental
Consent, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 754 (2016); Jennifer E. Chen, Family Conflicts: The
Role of Religion in Refusing Medical Treatment for Minors, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2007).
[W]here parents assert the right of refusal, the decision seems to turn on
a number of factors relating to the strength of the state’s interest which
includes the danger to the child, the potential success of the treatment
being refused, and the danger to others in the case of communicable
diseases.
Id. at 655.
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suspected.69 Because parents have an affirmative duty to seek medical
treatment for their children, the failure to do so can itself give rise to
claims of neglect, leading to state intervention.70
These changes reflect a general trend that a parent’s rights, though
protected by Due Process as fundamental liberty rights,71 are
nonetheless being increasingly eroded. “The historical changes moved
children from the control of their parents, notably their fathers, to a
position as special charges of the state, and then to a position as rightsbearing individuals subject to state regulation and control.”72
Still, in 2000, a fractured Supreme Court was unwilling to go so far.
In Troxel v. Granville, the Court rejected Washington State’s highly
permissive statute that empowered “any person may petition the court
for visitation rights at any time,’ and the court may grant such
visitation rights whenever ‘visitation may serve the best interest of the
child.’”73 The Court found that such a broad interest violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.74 The Court wrote, “[t]he
liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”75 The very
broad legislation substituted the judge for the parent in making the
initial determination of what is in the best interest of the parent’s
child.76
Once the visitation petition has been filed in court and the matter is
placed before a judge, a parent’s decision that visitation would not be
in the child’s best interest is accorded no deference. Section
26.10.160(3) contains no requirement that a court accord the parent’s
decision any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever.

69. See generally, Child Welfare Information Gateway, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU (2019) (providing state-by-state requirements)
https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/manda/.
70. See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway–An Updated Model of
Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUBLIC POLICY
251, 311 (2005).
71. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (“The ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause
includes the right of parents to ‘establish a home and bring up children,’ and ‘to control
the education of their own.’”) (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399, 401).
72. Minow, supra note 20, at 832.
73. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67 (emphasis in original) (quoting Rev. Code Wash.
§ 26.10.160(3) (2000)).
74. Id. at 72–73.
75. Id. at 65.
76. Id. at 67.
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Dissenting in Troxel, Justice Kennedy raised a consideration that may
well evolve into a new majority rule over time.78 He explained that
“Pierce and Meyer, had they been decided in recent times, may well
have been grounded upon First Amendment principles protecting
freedom of speech, belief, and religion.”79 Justice Scalia, in his dissent,
reinforced this suggestion: “Only three holdings of this Court rest in
whole or in part upon a substantive constitutional right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children—two of them from an era rich in
substantive due process holdings that have since been repudiated.”80
Religious conflict has often been a source of disagreement between the
state and the right of parents to raise their children.81 The conflict for
Betty Simmons in Prince also turned on how she sought to reflect her
faith.82 Once the conflicts involving religious conflict are excluded, there
are few areas where the state seeks to usurp the power of the family.
What that leaves, however, is little movement regarding the rights of
adolescents.
At the heart of these conflicts is a triangular relationship between
the child, the parent, and the state.83 In many of these instances, the
state is asserting greater authority over the parent in decision-making
for the best interest of the child, but by leaving the infirmity rules in
place, the state is reducing rather than enhancing the autonomy of the
individual child.84 As a practical matter, children have a lifetime—
77. Id.
78. Id. at 101–02 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235–36 (1972) (The First Amendment
prohibited the state of Wisconsin from requiring Amish children to attend public school).
82. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
83. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 898
(2007) (“Family law in the United States has long embraced the image of a triangle to
describe the allocation of legal authority over childrearing. Parents, children, and the
state stand at the three points of this triangle.”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Ecogenerism: An Environmentalist Approach to Protecting Endangered Children, 12 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 409, 422 (2005) (“As a teacher of constitutional and family law for over
fifteen years, I have illustrated the tensions between parents, children and the state with
a triangular diagram.”).
84. See Rosenbury, supra note 83, at 839 (“This orientation of the triangle
emphasizes that children are rarely given power to control their own destinies, but rather
are subject to the decisions of either their parents or the state.”); Ira C. Lupu, The
Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (1994)
(“[C]onflicts primarily involve the state and the mediating entity—the family or other
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though perhaps a limited one—of experience negotiating to wrest
personal authority from parents. But few children have the experience
or power to demand the same authority from the state itself. The
majority recognized this risk in Troxel, rejecting judicial authority over
parental authority, but it did not do so in hopes that the child would
become a more active participant in determining visitation.85
The economic infirmity of adolescents remains a rather arbitrary
rule. Many minors are quite capable of independent decision-making,
while others evidence poor impulse control, but this is equally true of
eighteen-year-old adults and many adults who are much older.86 Once
public policy can move past simplistic categories and replace them with
more nuanced policies on decision-making and autonomy by
adolescents, there can be improved understanding of the rights held by
minors and their individual interests regarding privacy and speech, as
well as the need to respect their ability to conduct transactions, often
implicating both these interests.
III. A MINOR FEMALE’S RIGHT TO CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION
One area where the Supreme Court has carved out a clear exception
to parental control is in access to abortion. Whether this continues,
however, will turn on the Supreme Court’s willingness to recognize the
precedential authority of Roe v. Wade,87 and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.88 In Whole Woman’s Health v.
Jackson,89 the Supreme Court denied an emergency stay against a
Texas law that empowers anyone to bring suit against anyone providing
an abortion or assisting in the procurement of an abortion.90 The Texas
law attempted to avoid state action by permitting the public to enforce

custodian—without the independent, autonomous voice of the child being heard in the
formal legal controversies.”).
85. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
86. Daniel, supra note 38, at 244–45.
At one point, the age of majority was set at twenty-one years of age. However,
it was reduced to eighteen in many jurisdictions to coincide with the lowering
of the voting age. This sweeping change in the age of majority with a simple
stroke of a pen further demonstrates that arbitrary age limits are not an
appropriate means of determining true contractual capacity. The fact that a
twenty-year-old person could be generally regarded as incapable of contracting
on one day and legally capable of contracting the next day due to a legislative
enactment highlights the lack of consideration given to a person’s actual
cognitive abilities under the current scheme.
87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
89. 141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021).
90. Id. at 2495–96.
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the public policy, in much the same way that restrictive covenants were
once used to bar Black, Jewish, or other “undesirable” home buyers
from desegregating neighborhoods. In addition, the Supreme Court has
agreed to hear Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,91 a
Mississippi law that directly challenges the central holding of Casey
that protects a woman’s right to an abortion prior to the viability of the
fetus.92 Whatever the future of abortion rights, for women under
eighteen, the Supreme Court has been consistent that they possess
similar rights to those of adult women. Those rights, however, are
generally mediated through their parents.
Under the precedent established by Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a woman’s right to
obtain an abortion was protected as a constitutional privacy right until
the viability of the fetus.93 The Supreme Court recognized that this
same right was just as fundamental to adolescent girls as to those who
had reached the age of adulthood.94
The jurisprudence reflects the reality that most adolescents have sex
before they turn eighteen. For women, the median age for engaging in
sex is 17.4 years of age, while for men, the median age for engaging in
sex is slightly older at 17.7 years of age.95 Since many teens engage in
behaviors that are sexual but do not result in intercourse, the age at
which they begin to expose themselves to sexually transmitted diseases
are even younger.
The Supreme Court recognized that minors had the same need and
the same rights to contraceptives.96 In Carey, the Court explained:

91. 945 F.3d 265, 277 (5th Cir. 2019) (“This law is facially unconstitutional because it
directly conflicts with Casey. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to fashion relief narrowly . . . .”).
92. Id. at 276.
[T]he Act is invalid as applied to every Mississippi woman seeking an abortion
for whom the Act is an actual restriction, never mind a large fraction of them.
And for those women, the obstacle is insurmountable, not merely substantial.
That the Act applies both pre- and post-viability does not save it.
93. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
Roe’s essential holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three parts. First is a
recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before
viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective
right to elect the procedure.
94. Id.
95. John Santelli et al., Abstinence and Abstinence-Only Education: A Review of U.S.
Policies and Programs, 38 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 72, 73 (2006).
96. Carey v. Population Serv., Intern., 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977).
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The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very
heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices. That
decision holds a particularly important place in the history of the
right of privacy, a right first explicitly recognized in an opinion
holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the use of
contraceptives . . . and most prominently vindicated in recent years
in the contexts of contraception . . . .97

In Carey, the Supreme Court struck down a law prohibiting
nonprescription contraceptives for minors under sixteen.98 In explaining
why access to contraceptives falls within the penumbra of privacy
interests, the Court made clear the reality that “the Constitution
protects ‘the right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into . . . the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.’”99 While strongly advocating for the privacy rights related to sex,
procreation, and abortion, the Court in Carey was less expansive
regarding the issues of the state’s regulation of minors and the role
parental authority exerted over the conduct of minors.100 “The question
of the extent of state power to regulate conduct of minors not
constitutionally regulable when committed by adults is a vexing one,
perhaps not susceptible of precise answer. We have been reluctant to
attempt to define ‘the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the
state.’”101
Without answering the question as to the scope of the minor’s
independent liberty interest, the Court in Carey relied on earlier
precedent that a state could not legislate “a blanket provision . . .
requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a
condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks
of her pregnancy.”102 It held that the restriction of access to
nonprescription contraception must therefore also be unconstitutional
because such a restriction would also interfere with the minor’s
decisions regarding sex and childbirth.103
Carey was particularly disdainful of New York’s arguments that the
restriction served to “emphasize to young people the seriousness with
97. Id. at 685 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
98. Id. at 687–88.
99. Id. at 687 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
100. Id. at 693.
101. Id. at 692.
102. Planned Parenthood of C. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (“[T]he State
does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly
arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient’s
pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.”).
103. Id.
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which the State views the decision to engage in sexual intercourse at an
early age.”104 The Court rejected the state’s position that contraception
should be increasingly inaccessible to deter juvenile sexual activity.105
Carey also looked at the First Amendment implications of
restrictions on the advertisement and display of contraceptives.106 It
extended protection for truthful commercial speech as falling within the
ambit of the First Amendment.107 Despite the prudish position of the
state that “advertisements of contraceptive products would be offensive
and embarrassing to those exposed to them, and that permitting them
would legitimize sexual activity of young people,”108 the Court refused
to bar protected speech because some members of the public were
uncomfortable acknowledging that people have sex and use
contraception.109 “At least where obscenity is not involved,” the Court
remarked, “we have consistently held that the fact that protected
speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression.”110
Carey extended a minor’s access to contraception, but the earlier case
of Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth first extended
the rights of minor females to include abortion.111 Under the Missouri
law at issue, the written consent of a parent or person in loco parentis
was required to approve the decision to have an abortion, unless “the
abortion is certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to
preserve the life of the mother.”112 Missouri supported the state’s right
to insist on parental approvals as part of its broader role in regulating
the decision-making of minors:
Missouri law, it is said, “is replete with provisions reflecting the
interest of the state in assuring the welfare of minors,” citing
statutes relating to a guardian ad litem for a court proceeding, to the
care of delinquent and neglected children, to child labor, and to
compulsory education . . . . Certain decisions are considered by the
State to be outside the scope of a minor’s ability to act in his own best
interest or in the interest of the public, citing statutes proscribing the
104. Carey, 431 U.S. at 697.
105. Id. at 697–98.
106. Id. at 700.
107. Id. at 699 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976)) (“[A] State may not ‘completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity,’ even when that
information could be categorized as ‘commercial speech.’”).
108. Id. at 701.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74–75.
112. Id. at 72.
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sale of firearms and deadly weapons to minors without parental
consent, and other statutes relating to minors’ exposure to certain
types of literature, the purchase by pawnbrokers of property from
minors, and the sale of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages to minors.
It is pointed out that the record contains testimony to the effect that
children of tender years (even ages 10 and 11) have sought abortions.
Thus, a State’s permitting a child to obtain an abortion without the
counsel of an adult “who has responsibility or concern for the child
would constitute an irresponsible abdication of the State’s duty to
protect the welfare of minors.”113

The state provided a clear roadmap highlighting the many ways in
which a minor’s conduct is subject to parental control, the state’s
control, or a combination of both.114 Of course, as a conflict over abortion
rights, the case is less about privacy than it is about the continuing
conflict of whether the life of a not-yet viable fetus should take
precedence over the female who is pregnant with it.115 The distinction is
highlighted by the Court, noting that “no other Missouri statute
specifically requires the additional consent of a minor’s parent for
medical or surgical treatment, and that in Missouri a minor legally may
consent to medical services for pregnancy (excluding abortion), venereal
disease, and drug abuse.”116
In denying the right of the state to require parental consent, the
Supreme Court made clear “the State does not have the constitutional
authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto
over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the
patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the
consent.”117 Other decisions have continued to prohibit absolute
parental approval laws.118
Nonetheless, the Court did not prohibit the state’s attempt to require
parental consent:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess

113. Id. at 72–73 (internal citations omitted). It is worth noting that even though the
statute in question refers to a woman’s access to abortion, the appellee’s brief still uses
“his own best interest” when referring to the minors under regulation, further
disenfranchising the adolescent females seeking their privacy rights.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 73.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 74.
118. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320 (2006); Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
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constitutional rights . . . . [Nonetheless,] the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of
adults.119

In addition, in the case of teen pregnancy, no rights are extended to
the fathers-to-be. This remains equally the case for both adolescents
and adult males responsible for the pregnancies.120 This exclusion of
input under Roe flows from the decisional privacy rights recognized
under the law rather than the earlier property-based authority that
gave fathers the power to determine who had legal custody and
parental rights over their children.121
The Court analogized a minor’s decision to abort a pregnancy with
decisions to undergo an operation, marry, or enter military service,
noting that all these activities require parental consent.122 Despite
encouraging parental consent, the Court also emphasized the
importance of a judicial bypass option that enabled a court rather than
a parent to provide the necessary approval.123 The portion of the opinion
by Justice O’Connor emphasized the prior decision in Ashcroft that
parental consent may be upheld if there is an “alternative procedure
whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently
mature to make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her
immaturity, an abortion would be in her best interests.”124
As a result of the complex and tortured constitutional jurisprudence
surrounding abortion rights, a minor female does not have the same
level of constitutional protection as her eighteen-year-old counterpart.
Despite the sexual activity of the majority of these women and their
unfettered right to contraception, the states continue to create obstacles

119. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
120. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Roe’s Effects on Family Law, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1339, 1350 (2014); Sally Sheldon, Unwilling Fathers and Abortion: Terminating Men’s
Child Support Obligations?, 66 MOD. L. REV. 175 (2003); Marshall B. Kapp, The Father’s
(Lack of) Right and Responsibilities in the Abortion Decision: An Examination of LegalEthical Implications, 9 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 369 (1982).
121. See Cynthia Soohoo, Reproductive Justice and Transformative Constitutionalism,
42 CARDOZO L. REV. 819, 835 (2021) (“Free women were charged with the majority of
work in the home and child-rearing under prevailing custom and the common law, but
fathers enjoyed the legal right to custody and control over minor children born to married
couples, and mothers did not have a right to custody upon divorce.”); see also, Jill Elaine
Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations,
90 GEO. L. J. 299, 310 (2002).
122. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 424–26 (1990).
123. Id. at 456; see also, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–644 (1979); Planned
Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 491 (1983).
124. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491.

2022

TO BE SEEN BUT NOT HEARD

483

to accessing abortion. Nonetheless, despite the tepid support for
constitutional privacy rights for minors in these cases, the Court
recognizes that the right exists, and the state can only undermine those
rights because of its own compelling interest.
IV. ADOLESCENT AUTONOMY AND THE ONLINE EXPERIENCE
Among the many challenges of developing an appropriate policy to
balance adolescents’ rights with the need for parental guidance and
school discipline is the stark reality facing teens both at home and
online. For many teens, the world is harsh and unforgiving.
Approximately one of every two marriages end in divorce.
Unrebutted evidence indicates that only 50% of minors in the State
of Minnesota reside with both biological parents.125 This conclusion is
substantially corroborated by a study indicating that 9% of the
minors in Minnesota live with neither parent and 33% live with only
one parent.126

A more recent national study roughly matches the earlier Minnesota
data, stating that “[t]wo out of three (66%) of adolescents ages 12–17
live with both parents, 24% with their mother only, 5% with their
father only, and 5% with neither parent.”127
Compounding the wide variety of living arrangements in which
adolescents might find themselves, their complex development from
childhood to adulthood often comes with additional stressors and
mental health issues. Mental health issues, depressive episodes, and
substance abuse disorders appear in adolescents at rates significantly
above younger children and adults.128 “Studies have shown that there is
nearly a twofold increase in mood disorders from the 13-to-14-year-old
age group to the 17-to-18-year-old age group.”129 The data reflect that
“[a]pproximately 938,000 U.S. adolescents aged 16 to 17 had [a major

125. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 437.
126. Id. at 437–38.
Involuntary involvement of the second biological parent is especially
detrimental when the minor comes from an abusive, dysfunctional family.
Notification of the minor’s pregnancy and abortion decision can provoke
violence . . . . Studies have shown that violence and harassment may continue
well beyond the divorce, especially when children are involved.
127. Youth Statistics: Family Structure and Relationships, supra note 18.
128. See Serious Mental Health Challenges Among Older Adolescents and Young
Adults, SAMHSA (May 6, 2014), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/sr173mh-challenges-young-adults-2014/sr173-mh-challenges-young-adults-2014/sr173-mhchallenges-young-adults-2014.htm.
129. Id.
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depressive episode] in the past year. This represents 1 out of every 10
older adolescents in this country (11.2 percent).”130 Teens need social
services and familial support to help reduce the likelihood of these
negative mental health outcomes and to address them as they arise.
Students without healthy families are at significant risk of increased
health issues and isolation.
Another challenging aspect of adolescence is the development of a
person’s sexual identity. “About 3.5% Americans identify themselves as
lesbian, gay, or bisexual while 0.3% identify themselves as transgender.
The LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) community belongs
to almost every race, ethnicity, religion, age, and socioeconomic
group.”131
According to multiple studies, LGBT teens were reported to have five
times as many reports of suicidal ideation. These teens “are prone to be
isolated and disconnected from the social networks,” which may further
the risk of depression.132 Additionally, “LGBT youth receive poor quality
of care due to stigma, lack of healthcare providers’ awareness, and
insensitivity to the unique needs of this community.”133
For adolescents abandoned because of their sexual identity, for those
who are diagnosed with a mental illness, for those living in violent or
unhealthy domestic settings, or for those who simply cannot
communicate effectively with their parents, the regulatory system must
provide a meaningful alternative like that of the judicial bypass that
exists in the abortion context. Unfortunately, it is only around abortion
where a strategy has been adopted. Were there not a Supreme Court
mandate and constitutional imperative to do so, it is unlikely that there
would be a strategy to provide the resources needed for these millions of
teens with mental health and developmental issues.
The need for sufficient maturity to address the concerns of
independent decision-making regarding an adolescent’s online speech,
privacy, and sexual activity should also be considered in the context of
the environment in which they find themselves:
Even though digital media has become an essential part of everyday
life . . . [i]t is not uncommon for writers to receive death threats for

130. Id.
131. Hudaisa Hafeez, et al., Health Care Disparities Among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
and Transgender Youth: A Literature Review, CUREUS (Apr. 20, 2017). See JON M. GARON,
PARENTING FOR THE DIGITAL GENERATION 131, 133 (2022) (forthcoming, manuscript on
file with author) (“Other reports suggest the LGBTQ population is twice the amount
quoted, hovering at around 7%.”).
132. Hudaisa, supra note 131.
133. Id.
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unpopular posts or for athletes to receive hate-filled posts because of
errors on the field or comments off the field. High school athletes
have received attacks regarding their choice of where to play in
college . . . . High school athletes, cheerleaders, and other school
celebrities are often the focus of shameful attacks. For other
students, the bullying, harassment, and stalking come from within
the school, using the power of digital media to magnify and
exacerbate bullying behavior. The real harm of online harassment
cannot be overstated.134

According to a Pew Research Survey, 59% of teens ages 13–17 have
been victims of cyberbullying of some kind.135 The most common version
of online abuse is name-calling as 42% of students having been namecalled at some point in their lives. A quarter of all students report
receiving explicit images they did not request, and 7% of students have
had their explicit images shared without their consent. More than a
fifth of students (21%) have been stalked by others using digital media,
and nearly a third (32%) have been the victims of false rumor
campaigns. Girls are more likely than boys to be the targets of false
rumors and sexually explicit content, but both groups have been
victimized substantially. Girls, however, are much more likely to be the
targets of four or more different forms of online harassment than boys.
15% of girls report high levels of targeted abuse compared to only 4% of
boys.136
Teens that participated in the survey universally agreed that
cyberbullying and online harassment are problems, with 63% describing
them as major problems. The survey found that the teens do not believe
that schools, social media platforms, or politicians are helping solve the
problems. The only good news is that the teens surveyed found that
parents were more effective than the other groups in addressing these
concerns.137 “Although the federal government has many mandates
regarding K-12 education, there are no federal programs, curricula, or
staff training mandates regarding bullying for the schools. Federal
statistics do not reflect the number of students who report being bullied
or harassed while in school.”138

134. GARON, supra note 131, at 143.
135. Monica Anderson, A Majority of Teens Have Experienced Some Form of
Cyberbullying,
PEW
RESEARCH
CENTER
(Sept.
27,
2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/09/27/a-majority-of-teens-have-experiencedsome-form-of-cyberbullying/.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. GARON, supra note 131, at 210.
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In comparing decisional privacy to informational privacy, the most
relevant and expansive right under the abortion jurisprudence is the
right to access nonprescription birth control. Although the Court in
Carey was focused on the decisional privacy choice regarding conception
and contraception, it directly implicated the minor’s access to the
information about contraception.139 Interestingly, the right to advertise
abortion services was recognized as protected commercial speech three
years before Virginia Board of Pharmacy was decided.140 In Bigelow v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court rejected the state’s attempt to block
regulations related to New York abortion services.141
Just as the First Amendment rights in commercial speech expanded
in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the First Amendment rights of minors to
access content is well recognized,142 reflecting an aspect of minors’
rights that have similarly expanded in the past half-century.143 Most
notably, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,144 the Court espoused a vigorous defense of students’ free
speech rights and the very limited role that the age of the individual
had on the individual’s constitutional protections.145 The Court rejected
the position advocated in the concurrence of Justice Stewart that
“school discipline aside, the First Amendment rights of children are coextensive with those of adults.”146
The First Amendment rights of children are not limited to domestic
law. At least in theory, the international treaties protecting children
suggest that children have more rights than those being recognized in
139. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685 (“The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at
the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices. That decision holds a
particularly important place in the history of the right of privacy . . . .”).
140. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 (1975) (“Virginia courts erred in their
assumptions that advertising, as such, was entitled to no First Amendment
protection . . . .”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
141. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812 (“It is to be observed that the advertisement announced
that the Women’s Pavilion of New York City would help women with unwanted
pregnancies to obtain ‘immediate placement in accredited hospitals and clinics at low cost’
and would ‘make all arrangements’ on a ‘strictly confidential’ basis . . . .”).
142. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other
legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from
ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. In most
circumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less
applicable when government seeks to control the flow of information to minors.
Id. at 213–14.
143. Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
144. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
145. Id. at 513–14.
146. Id. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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domestic court decisions. The United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child recognizes that children are entitled to parental obligations
but also economic rights, minority rights, education, and political rights
analogous to those found in the First Amendment procedural
protections.147 Articles 13–15 provide the rights analogous to the First
Amendment:
Article 13
1. The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child’s
choice . . . .
Article 14
1. States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion.
2. States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents
and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the
child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with
the evolving capacities of the child.
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others.
Article 15
1. States Parties recognize the rights of the child to freedom of
association and to freedom of peaceful assembly.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights other
than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security
or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.148

147. See U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 10; see also Levesque,
supra note 9, at 271.
148. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 10, at Art. 13–15.
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In addition, Article 16 goes much further than United States law,
providing specific privacy protection:
1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.
2. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.149

Despite the First Amendment rights of minors, Congress and state
legislators have not stopped their efforts to protect minors from
informational harms. For example, in 1968, in Ginsberg v. State of
N.Y.,150 the Supreme Court upheld a regulation barring the sale of
pornography to minors which was non-obscene and lawful to sell to
adults.151 Regulators have attempted to extend Ginsberg, but without
success. As the Internet became a social force, Congress attempted to
censor the Internet from pornographic content to protect minors, but
that effort was expeditiously deemed unconstitutional by the courts.152
A similar effort was made in municipal and state laws to extend
Ginsberg to ultraviolent or obscene levels of violence in videogames,
which efforts were also held as unconstitutional.153
Revelations about the ongoing harm to minors on social media are
likely to spur additional legislative efforts. In September 2021, the Wall
Street Journal exposed internal reports of Facebook, the parent
company for Instagram, that demonstrated the continuing harm to
some of its adolescent users—even as the company’s CEO was testifying
before Congress that no such harms existed.154 According to the Wall
Street Journal story, internal reports provided damning insights into

149. Id. at Art. 16.
150. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
151. Id. at 639.
The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State’s
constitutional power to regulate, and, in our view, two interests justify the
limitations in § 484-h upon the availability of sex material to minors under 17,
at least if it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors’ exposure to
such material might be harmful.
152. See The Children’s Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006);
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 672–73 (2004); ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 207 (3rd
Cir. 2008).
153. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 821.
154. Georgia Wells, Jeff Horwitz, & Deepa Seetharaman, The Facebook Files: Facebook
Knows Instagram Is Toxic for Teen Girls, Its Research Shows, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14,
2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-instagram-is-toxic-for-teen-girlscompany-documents-show-11631620739.
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the negative impact of Instagram on a portion of its most vulnerable
users:
We make body image issues worse for one in three teen girls . . . .
Teens blame Instagram for increases in the rate of anxiety and
depression . . . This reaction was unprompted and consistent across
all groups . . . . 32 percent of teen girls said that when they felt bad
about their bodies, Instagram made them feel worse . . . .
Comparisons on Instagram can change how young women view and
describe themselves.155

Reports of the data included in the story show that Facebook tracked
information demonstrating that “[a]mong teens who reported
experiencing suicidal thoughts, 6 percent of U.S. users and 13 percent
of U.K. users attributed ideation to Instagram.”156 Instead of releasing
this data, when testifying before Congress in March 2021, Facebook
CEO Mark Zuckerberg stated, “[t]he research that we’ve seen is that
using social apps to connect with other people can have positive mentalhealth benefits.”157 While the statement may contain some truth, the
omission of the harm makes the statement materially misleading.
Each social media platform has its own attributes. Instagram
emphasizes still pictures and emphasizes images and beauty in ways
very different from Facebook’s stories or TikTok’s dance-infused
movement clips. It may be that the emphasis on image exacerbates the
anxieties of users who struggle with their body image or their aesthetic
appeal.158
At this point, it’s a cliché even to note that social media makes us feel
like shit about ourselves. A series of studies have shown a correlation
between activities like scrolling through Instagram and negative
body image. A 2020 study of undergraduate women has shown
further that those asked to scroll through Instagram—but not
Facebook, which emphasizes text more than photos—showed
significantly decreased body satisfaction than those asked to do the

155. See id.; Claire Lampen, Instagram Knows Just How Damaging It Is for Teen
Girls, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.thecut.com/2021/09/facebook-very-awarethat-instagram-harms-teen-mental-health.html.
156. Lampen, supra note 155.
157. Id.
158. See Rebecca Jennings, The Paradox of Online “Body Positivity,” VOX (Jan. 13,
2021),
https://www.vox.com/the-goods/22226997/body-positivity-instagram-tiktokfatphobia-social-media (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
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reverse.159 For homosexual men, Instagram can also reinforce the
idea that queer culture is only for “ripped, statuesque men.”160

The negative impact of Instagram, TikTok, and other doom-scrolling
services should not be newsworthy because there has been public data
available for years. The importance of the Facebook revelations is the
extent to which the company’s internal data has validated researcher
concerns and to which the company has been misleading regulators
about its products’ ongoing harm.161
Facebook used external data to justify its response, which
emphasized that much of the company’s internal research matches the
data collected by other researchers.162
The research on the effects of social media on people’s well-being is
mixed, and our own research mirrors external research . . . . A mixed
methods study from Harvard described the “see-saw” of positive and
negative experiences that US teens have on social media . . . .
According to research by Pew Internet on teens in the US, 81% of
teens said that social media makes them feel more connected to their
friends, while 26% reported social media makes them feel worse
about their lives. Our findings were similar. Many said Instagram
makes things better or has no effect, but some, particularly those
who were already feeling down, said Instagram may make things
worse.163

Although Facebook has responded with an acknowledgment that
social media has this effect, it has not identified how its own algorithms
and editorial systems promote obsessive and destructive usage and
engagement rather than safe behaviors of use. The response included
the laughably lame reply, “[o]ne idea we think has promise is finding
opportunities to jump in if we see people dwelling on certain types of
content.”164 Given that the data has been available for years, this tepid

159. Id. (citing Renee Engel, et. al., Compared to Facebook, Instagram Use Causes
More Appearance Comparison and Lower Body Satisfaction in College Women, BODY
IMAGE (Sept. 2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bodyim.2020.04.007.).
160. Id.
161. See Grace Holland & Marika Tiggemann, A Systematic Review of the Impact of the
Use of Social Networking Sites on Body Image and Disordered Eating Outcomes, BODY
IMAGE
(Jun.
2016),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1740144516300912?via%3Dihub.
162. Karina Newton, Using Research to Improve Your Experience, INSTAGRAM (Sept.
14, 2021), https://about.instagram.com/blog/announcements/using-research-to-improveyour-experience (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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musing highlights the “profits over people” perspective that has been at
the heart of the company from its foundation—and this is the behavior
that regulators at home and abroad need to address.
If U.S. law treated the treaty obligation to protect children’s “privacy,
family, home or . . . honour,”165 then substantial additional efforts would
be necessary to protect adolescents from the predatory behavior of
social media purveyors who collect data on the mental health harms
they are perpetrating while continuing to develop algorithms that
feature these harmful—but legal—images into the user’s feed. State
and federal officials may wish to consider regulations similar to those
governing casinos that obligate the companies to undertake efforts to
reduce compulsive behaviors and to hold them accountable once the
companies are on notice that compulsive behavior is occurring.166
A. COPPA’s Limitations on Minor’s Access to Control Informational
Privacy
Congress has had modest success in extending privacy protection for
minors under the age of thirteen. Congress enacted the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) to limit advertising directed at
children and restrict the amount of personal information that
advertisers can collect regarding children.167 The implementing
regulations, known as the COPPA Rule, were adopted by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) in 1999,168 and substantially updated in
2012.169 In enacting and revising the COPPA Rule, the FTC’s goal was
to put parents in charge of privacy and accessibility for websites when
visited by children under the age of thirteen.170 As the FTC explained,
“[t]he [FTC] adopted final amendments to the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Rule that strengthen kids’ privacy protections and give

165. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 10, at Art. 16.
166. See, e.g., Lauren Woods, Setting Limits to Stop the Gambling Epidemic, UCONN
TODAY (Apr. 18, 2019), https://today.uconn.edu/2019/04/setting-limits-stop-gamblingepidemic/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2022); Responsible Gaming: Regulations & Statutes, AM.
GAMBLING ASS’N (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.americangaming.org/resources/responsiblegaming-regulations-statutes-2/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
167. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506
(2021).
168. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2000). The
COPPA Rule took effect on April 21, 2000.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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parents greater control over the personal information that websites and
online services may collect from children under 13.”171
To the extent that the COPPA Rule limits or restricts the ability of
commercial vendors to collect information about their customers
because they are under the age of thirteen, those First Amendment
considerations are primarily the interests of the commercial vendors
rather than the minor, which at least has been the approach taken by
the Supreme Court when reviewing analogous regulations. The most
similar example of this limitation to collect information is the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), enacted to rein in
unsolicited telephone calls.172 Despite the clear speech issues at stake in
limiting telephone solicitation, the TCPA has withstood constitutional
challenge.173 Like COPPA, the TCPA is an administrative restriction
administered by the FTC.174 As a result, neither COPPA nor the TCPA
extends to nonprofit organizations because the FTC does not have
statutory authority over those entities.175 The FTC can limit the
commercial speech activities of for-profit organizations, provided the
standards adopted by Congress and the agency are consistent with the
protections for commercial speech,176 and meet at least the
constitutional review standard of intermediate scrutiny.177 If the speech

171. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Strengthens Kids’ Privacy, Gives Parents
Greater Control over Their Information by Amending Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Rule (Dec. 19, 2012), FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/12/coppa.shtm (last visited Jan.
23, 2022).
172. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)) (“The use of the
telephone to market goods and services to the home and other businesses is now pervasive
due to the increased use of cost-effective telemarketing techniques.”); see Justin Hurwitz,
Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private Speech: First Amendment
Lessons from the FCC’s TCPA Rules, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2 (2018).
173. See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).
174. 47 U.S.C. § 227.
175. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a) (2006); Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress
Pursuant to the Do Not Call Implementation Act on Regulatory Coordination in Federal
Telemarketing Laws, FTC 1, 7 n. 20 (Sept. 1, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/federaltrade-commission-report-congress-pursuant-do-not-call-implementation-act-regulatory.
Although non-profit organizations are outside the jurisdiction of the FTC,
§ 1011 of the USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001),
expanded the Telemarketing Act’s definition of “telemarketing” to encompass
any call soliciting a “charitable contribution, donation, or gift of money or any
other thing of value.”
176. See e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
177. Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2356 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“In my view, however, the
government-debt exception in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) still fails intermediate scrutiny because
it is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.”).
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regulations are also based on content, then the regulations must meet
strict scrutiny.178
COPPA has not been heavily litigated.179 By its terms, COPPA
“prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in connection with the
collection, use, and/or disclosure of personal information from and about
children on the Internet.”180 The COPPA Rule prohibits a website
operator or online service provider from collecting personal information
of a minor under thirteen without the advance consent of the child’s
parent or guardian.181
At the same time, COPPA has a “mixed audience exception” that
prominent social media companies use to market to children under
thirteen and collect their information for purposes of behavioral
advertising.182
The mixed-audience exception makes clear that where an app does
not target children as its primary audience, as long as it screens its
users for age and does not collect personal information from users
who identify themselves as under thirteen without complying with
certain notice and consent requirements, the app will not be deemed
directed to children.183

If an app is not child directed, it follows that an ad network that
collects information from users of that app could not be found to have
“actual knowledge” that the app is directed to children.184

178. See id.
179. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 773,
834 (2020) (“Since the mid-1990s, the FTC has enforced a largely self-regulatory privacy
regime, which has allowed industry to set the terms of the debate.”); Daniel J. Solove &
Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
583, 606 (2014) (“In nearly all of the FTC’s Section 5 cases and complaints alleging
violations of COPPA, GLBA, and the Safe Harbor Agreement, the final disposition of the
matter is a settlement, default judgment, or abandonment of the action by the FTC in the
investigatory stage.”).
180. 16 C.F.R. § 312.1 (2013); See New Mexico ex rel. Balderas v. Tiny Lab
Productions, 516 F.Supp.3d 1293, 1296–98 (D.N.M. Feb. 2, 2021).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1) (1998) (Under the COPPA Rule, “[i]t is unlawful for an
operator of a website or online service directed to children, or any operator that has actual
knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child, to collect personal
information from a child in a manner that violates the [COPPA] regulations.”); 16 C.F.R.
§ 312.3(a) (2013)(“[A]n operator must . . . . [o]btain verifiable parental consent prior to any
collection, use, and/or disclosure of personal information from children[.]”).
182. New Mexico ex rel. Balderas, 516 F.Supp.3d at 1296.
183. Id. at 1297–98.
184. Id. at 1299 (citing 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2013)).

494

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

As explained by Google and adopted by the Federal District Court
order, asking users for their age is essentially all a company needs to do
to avoid violating COPPA.185 Since most content targeting children can
be conceptualized as targeting families including children under
thirteen, the “mixed audience” exception largely sidelines COPPA as a
meaningful regulation.
From a perspective of privacy, COPPA’s failure is quite
disappointing. Although the FTC did negotiate a $170 million fine
against Google and its subsidiary, YouTube, for flagrant violations of
COPPA in 2019, only after many years did YouTube market itself as
the leading children’s media platform while simultaneously using
cookies to aggressively track children’s usage without even the fig-leaf
of age self-verification.186 The FTC’s Business Center lists only thirtysix cases involving COPPA actions between February 1999 and July
2020.187 This is hardly a compelling regulation of the untold number of
website operators and app vendors who solicit or target children.
COPPA is “not designed to protect children from viewing particular
types of content wherever they might go online.”188 COPPA “does not
require operators to ask the age of visitors. However, an operator of a
general audience site or service that chooses to screen its users for age
in a neutral fashion may rely on the age information its users enter,
even if that age information is not accurate.”189 COPPA provides an
excellent tool for responsible companies attempting to respect the
privacy of young children, but does almost nothing to stop predatory
companies from exploiting those children.
Nonetheless, the regulation is relevant to the rights of children and
the family because it reflects the continuing assumption under federal
law that parents best protect the rights of children. By shifting the
ability of a child under thirteen to access sites with adult content to the
authority of the parent, the COPPA Rule reinforces the continuing

185. Id.
186. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google and YouTube Will Pay Record $170
Million for Alleged Violations of Children’s Privacy Law, FTC (Sept. 4, 2019), available
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/09/google-youtube-will-pay-record170-million-alleged-violations (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
187. Legal Resources, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/legalresources?type=case&field_consumer_protection_topics_tid=246 (last visited May 15,
2021).
188. A Guide for Business and Parents and Small Entity Compliance Guide, FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequentlyasked-questions-0, (last visited May 15, 2021).
189. Id.
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expectation under U.S. law that the parents have the primary
decisional authority over the minor’s privacy.
Had COPPA worked, advocates might have litigated for minors even
under the age of thirteen, so that they should have the right to access
websites and apps with more adult content. As evidenced by the consent
decree released by Google and YouTube, millions of children can access
this content. Had the parental controls worked, there may have been a
serious concern that those controls directly interfered with the minors’
rights to access content, an important aspect of the First Amendment.
COPPA’s systemic failures are bad for privacy regulation but good for
the free speech rights of those the law was designed to protect.
B. In Cyberspace Everyone Is an Adult . . . Or a Dog
In 1993, The New Yorker cartoonist, Peter Steiner, captured the
essence of online anonymity with his famous cartoon with the text “[o]n
the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.”190 When the New York Times
wrote about the cartoon in 2000, it reported that the panel had become
the single most popular licensed image of The New Yorker.191 The
cartoon has spawned many variations and imitations. It also captures
one version of Internet reality—the ability to move pseudonymously
through cyberspace.192 The prized anonymity of cyberspace and the
power to project any identity one wishes contrasts with the vast amount
of personal information collected by Internet host providers, websites,
apps, and similar telecommunications information.193
The current state of the information society is on the cusp of another
revolution. The government has no meaningful restrictions on
non-private communications, and increasingly law enforcement actively
monitors Internet activity, online content, and social media sites.194
“[T]oday’s surveillance analysts have a new source of information: social

190. Glenn Fleishman, Cartoon Captures Spirit of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14,
2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/14/technology/cartoon-captures-spirit-of-theinternet.html.
191. Id.
192. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1472–
1501 (2000) (anticipating the transition from the age of anonymity to the era of
surveillance).
193. See A. Michael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well: Anonymity in a Time of
Surveillance, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 95 (2017).
194. See id. at 113 (“Where a decade ago it was still reasonable to see the constellation
of technologies around the Internet as fundamentally empowering and anti-totalitarian, that
optimism is increasingly difficult to sustain . . . .”); see also Rachel Levinson-Waldman & Ángel
Díaz, How to Reform Police Monitoring of Social Media, BROOKINGS (Jul. 9, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-to-reform-police-monitoring-of-social-media/.
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media. Consider the recent protests over the police killings of George
Floyd and Breonna Taylor. As demonstrations spread across the
country, the FBI and local police monitored social media and made
arrests based on what people have posted online.”195
Adolescents are active participants in the online world, and social
media plays a large part in the typical teen’s life. For U.S. teens,
smartphones have become ubiquitous. As of 2019, 84% of teens aged
13–18 owned their own smartphones.196
Surveys show that 90% of teens ages 13–17 have used social media.
75% report having at least one active social media profile, and 51%
report visiting a social media site at least daily. Two-thirds of teens
have their own mobile devices with Internet capabilities. On average,
teens are online almost nine hours a day, not including time for
homework.197

This heavy reliance on social media and mobile phones often means
that many of teens’ thoughts, associations, religious affiliations, gender
identities, political views, and sexual activities are documented and
shared in a manner that makes the information visible to ISPs,
advertisers, potential employers, school districts, and colleges, as well
as to state and federal law enforcement.
The Supreme Court has moved to limit unwarranted searches and
seizures, but these cases have focused on private information. In Riley
v. California,198 the Supreme Court recognized the vast amount of
information an individual might store on a cell phone and ruled that the
Fourth Amendment protects cell phone searches.199
195. Waldman & Díaz, supra note 194.
196. Teen Social Media Statistics 2021 (What Parents Need to Know), SMART SOCIAL
(Feb. 25, 2020), https://smartsocial.com/social-media-statistics/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
197. Social
Media
and
Teens,
AACAP
(Mar.
2018),
https://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Families_and_Youth/Facts_for_Families/FFFGuide/Social-Media-and-Teens-100.aspx.
198. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
199. Id. at 393.
Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other
objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person. The term “cell phone” is
itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers
that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just
as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders,
libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.
One of the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their
immense storage capacity. Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited
by physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a
narrow intrusion on privacy.
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Two years earlier, in United States v. Jones,200 the Supreme Court
rejected the use of monitoring a person’s movements electronically, but
the Court did so in an opinion that left questions of GPS monitoring,
app-based surveillance, and other modern techniques largely
unanswered.201 The concurrence by Justice Sotomayor raised these
concerns more directly, providing a roadmap for additional
constitutional protections.202 Most recently, in Carpenter v. U.S.,203 the
Supreme Court has again expanded the warrant requirement by
requiring a warrant when the government “accesses historical cell
phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past
movements.”204 Carpenter is more significant than earlier decisions
because the cell phone records were under the legal control of the
cellular telephone service providers.205 The decision made a small
incursion into the third-party doctrine that when a third party holds a
person’s records, the person did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in those records.206
These Supreme Court decisions provide some modest hope that
government access to personal information will not lead to widespread
surveillance.207 But, the reality of social media, expansion of facial
recognition technologies, increased use of biometric information, and
similar trends show an alarming ease for the government to track the
information, movements, and preferences of everyone in the country.

200. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
201. Id. at 404–05.
It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government
physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.
We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.
202. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”).
203. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
204. Id. at 2210–11.
205. Id. at 2212.
206. See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that there is no expectation of
privacy in financial records held by a bank); see also Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735 (1979)
(holding that there is no expectation of privacy in records of dialed telephone numbers
conveyed to telephone company).
207. In practice, these hopes must be extremely modest. Prosecutors often use both a
warrant and a gag order to secretly collect private information on a regular basis. See Jay
Greene & Drew Harwell, When the FBI Seizes Your Messages from Big Tech, You May Not
Know
It
for
Years,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
25,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/09/25/tech-subpoena-secrecy-fight/.
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The same is largely true across the globe, despite the protestations of
some countries that employ self-restraint.208
The Court in Carpenter, however, made clear that the decision was
not itself a broader limitation on governmental intrusion into thirdparty records or other forms of surveillance.209
Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on
matters not before us: real-time CSLI or “tower dumps” (a download
of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell
site during a particular interval). We do not disturb the application of
Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance
techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we address
other business records that might incidentally reveal location
information. Further, our opinion does not consider other collection
techniques involving foreign affairs or national security.210

Carpenter, therefore, puts a finger in the dike, but does not go far
enough to stop most public surveillance. As noted earlier, COPPA selfregulation has resulted in companies primarily adopting the approach
taken by YouTube and others to treat their online services as “mixed
usage” to eliminate the need for COPPA compliance.211 By its terms,
COPPA covers only minors under the age of thirteen, treating teens
between the ages of thirteen and seventeen as adults for all purposes of
their online experience.212 There are numerous federal laws governing
sectoral privacy involving health care, financial records, credit, and
other specific services, but these do not apply to the use of most private
information presented on social media.213 There are also an increasing
number of state laws intended to reduce tracking for the purpose of
behavioral advertising.214
Neither the sectoral privacy laws nor the state privacy law, however,
address the complex problems that adolescents face in the online
sphere. The modern Internet has lost its anonymity; the average teen

208. See Froomkin, supra note 193, at 120–22 (“The Canadian intelligence agency, the
Communications Security Establishment (“CSE”), tracks millions of video and document
downloads daily . . . . Meanwhile, some European governments found ways to circumvent
data collection and transfer regulations in order to implement and facilitate identification
requirements.”).
209. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
210. Id.
211. New Mexico ex rel. Balderas, 516 F. Supp. 3d at 1297–98.
212. Id.
213. See generally, JON M. GARON, THE SHORT AND HAPPY GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND
CYBERSECURITY LAW (2020).
214. Id.
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spends the majority of the waking day connected through cell phones
and online accounts; parents have little legal authority over what the
teens do online or in the bedroom; yet the family is legally expected to
be the primary authority for these teens’ upbringing and well-being.
V. INEFFECTIVE STRATEGIES TO AVOID
A. The Schoolhouse and Increased Discipline Are Not the Answer
Teens need supervision and guidance. The law generally defers to
parents as the providers of that support, but for many, the actual family
situation is far removed from an idyllic model of domestic harmony.
COPPA was never intended to solve this problem, and it has largely
failed to provide a solution to the very limited problem it did address.
Frustrated and struggling, parents and politicians have turned to the
schools to become the source for the regulation of these concerns.
Schools, however, are neither empowered nor equipped to take on this
broad social obligation. A frustrated public-school teacher summed up
the situation clearly:
The way a whole society behaves is called culture, and American
culture is changing significantly, not always clearly for the better.
Blaming schools for what we don’t like about the way our culture is
changing is a cheap out, and an abject failure to confront the real
issues in all their breadth and complexity.215

The role of schools in behavioral discipline is highly contentious,
particularly concerning student speech and privacy. Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,216 was the first of the
modern Supreme Court decisions addressing this issue. When young
students wore black armbands to protest the ongoing war in Vietnam,
the Supreme Court recognized their silent protest to be speech worthy
of First Amendment protection.217 The Court took a strong stance to
protect the rights of the students to raise their political voices to a topic
of considerable concern in the society surrounding them.218 “Students in
school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution.

215. Maureen Downey, Are We Asking Teachers to Provide Parenting and Upbringing
Only Families Can Provide?, AJC (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/blog/getschooled/are-asking-teachers-provide-parenting-and-upbringing-only-families-canprovide/ARNO9VXpJ47bNIvhR2sDQJ/.
216. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
217. Id. at 508–10.
218. Id. at 513.
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They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect,
just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.”219
Since Tinker, however, the Court has focused more on discipline and
decorum than on the rights of the students. In Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser,220 a student was suspended for a student assembly speech
that dripped with sexual innuendo and allusions. Although the student
did not use any profanity, he nonetheless delivered a ribald oration that
many, but not all, of his fourteen-year-old classmates understood.221
The Court in Fraser adopted the position that “public education must
prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic . . . . It must inculcate the
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to
happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the
community and the nation.”222 The Court explained that “it is a highly
appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of
vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”223 Indeed, the
“fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or
highly threatening to others.”224
The Supreme Court again addressed the concerns regarding the
control a school can impose on a student in the context of academic
content. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,225 the Court
addressed the extent to which a school may control the content of the
school newspaper. The petitioner school district offered participation in
the school newspaper as part of a high school journalism course.226 The
Court in Hazelwood reaffirmed the Tinker position that students
“cannot be punished merely for expressing their personal views on the
school premises,” whether “in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on
the campus during the authorized hour[.]”227 But, the Court did so with
the qualification on those rights and that they may be exercised unless

219. Id. at 511.
220. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
221. Id. at 678–79. Fraser was given a three-day suspension, though he returned to
school on the third day. “The hearing officer determined that the speech given by
respondent was ‘indecent, lewd, and offensive to the modesty and decency of many of the
students and faculty in attendance at the assembly.’” Id.
222. Id. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 228 (1968)).
223. Id. at 676.
224. Id. at 683 (“The pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser’s speech was plainly
offensive to both teachers and students—indeed to any mature person.”).
225. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
226. Id. at 262.
227. Id. at 265–66.
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school authorities have reason to believe that such expression will
“substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the
rights of other students.”228
The Court distinguished the obligation to tolerate particular,
non-disruptive student speech from the school district’s obligation to
affirmatively promote student speech that was inconsistent with the
“imprimatur of the school.”229 The Court rejected any obligation of the
school district to do so.230 The Court dismissed the statements of the
school district that the school newspaper’s protection under the policy
that “[s]chool sponsored student publications will not restrict free
expression or diverse viewpoints within the rules of responsible
journalism.”231 Instead of interpreting the school board policy, the
Supreme Court made very clear that the school principal could override
the classroom teacher and make the institutional determination of
which stories could be permitted to run.232
In Morse v. Frederick,233 the Supreme Court also allowed a school to
discipline students for hanging a banner which read “Bong Hits 4
Jesus” at an Olympic torch relay. The event was treated as a school
function because students were dismissed from class to stand along the
parade route, participating “as an approved social event or class trip.”234
The Court framed Morse as a simple case: “[t]he question thus becomes
whether a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict
student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed
as promoting illegal drug use. We hold that she may.”235

228. Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 512–13).
229. Id. at 270–71.
The question of whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate
particular student speech—the question that we addressed in Tinker—is
different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school
affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former question
addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that
happens to occur on the school premises. The latter question concerns
educators’ authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions,
and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. These
activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether
or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are
supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or
skills to student participants and audiences.
230. Id. at 273.
231. Id. at 268.
232. Id. at 273.
233. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
234. Id. at 396.
235. Id. at 403.
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The Supreme Court borrowed from the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that diminished the full protection of the Constitution in
the context of warrantless searches.236 Largely shedding the robust
protections originally espoused in Tinker, the Court emphasized that
deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an “important—indeed, perhaps
compelling” interest. “Drug abuse can cause severe and permanent
damage to the health and well-being of young people.”237 The Court was
not willing to label the banner “offensive” under the standard
established in Fraser, but instead imbued the juvenile prank with the
heightened advocational impact of an unprotected nature.238
In each of the four cases, the Supreme Court has been careful to
establish that the school district’s authority has been to manage and
censor on-campus speech or speech that was part of the school’s offcampus school-sanctioned activities. Off-campus speech posed a more
challenging question. Still, most circuit courts had found schools to
have jurisdiction when the speech is directed at the schools, is
disrupted, or has a significant nexus to the school.239 When the Third
Circuit rejected this approach and highlighted the divergent lower court
approaches, the Supreme Court took a cautious step to address the
issue of student speech that occurs on social media.240
In Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., the Supreme Court took up
a student’s challenge to her suspension from the junior varsity
cheerleading squad based on the cheerleader posting a Snapchat
message to her friends in which she held up her middle finger to the
camera with the words “f*** school f*** softball f*** cheer f***
everything” superimposed on the image.241 The student, B.L., was upset
because she was not elevated to the varsity cheerleading team. B.L. did
not send her Snapchat beyond her 250 friends. Although her friends
included other members of the cheerleading teams, none of the coaches

236. See id. at 406 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56
(1995)) (“Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere . . .”); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829–30 (2002)
(“‘special needs’ inherent in the public-school context”).
237. Morse, 551 U.S. at 407 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661).
238. Id. at 409.
239. B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S.
Ct. 976 (2021). Other courts have required a “nexus” between the speech and the school’s
“pedagogical interests” or extended Tinker to speech that was “intentionally direct[ed] at
the school community.” See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir.
2011); Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 394 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
240. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. by and through Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
241. Id. at 2043.
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or school administrators were included. Most importantly, the
“student’s speech took place outside of school hours and away from the
school’s campus.”242 The speech’s location became the critical distinction
because the Third Circuit ruled that as a result of the off-campus
nature of the speech,243 the school district had no authority to regulate
the speech or punish the student.244 The Third Circuit explained that
“the First Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus speech
to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the community at
large.”245 Although the Supreme Court affirmed the outcome of the case
for the student cheerleader, it rejected the Third Circuit’s blanket
refusal to extend Tinker.246 Instead, the Court held that while the
school may have a valid interest in controlling student speech offcampus,247 the school district violated B.L.’s First Amendment rights in
reprimanding her for her post, which is protected speech.248
The lower courts had struggled to develop a standard that reflects
the caselaw of Tinker, Fraser, Frederick, and Kuhlmeier. The Supreme
Court used the framework of these four cases to provide some limited
guidance for the courts and the school districts when regulating online
speech.
We have made clear that students do not “shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression,” even “at the school house
gate.” But we have also made clear that courts must apply the First
Amendment “in light of the special characteristics of the school

242. Id. at 2042–43.
243. B.L. by and through Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir.
2020), aff’d on different grounds, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
B.L. created the snap away from campus, over the weekend, and without
school resources, and she shared it on a social media platform unaffiliated with
the school. And while the snap mentioned the school and reached MAHS
students and officials, J.S. and Layshock hold that those few points of contact
are not enough.
244. Id. at 185–86.
245. Id. at 189 (quoting J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915,
936 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring)).
246. Id. at 190.
247. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. by and through Levy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045 (“Unlike
the Third Circuit, we do not believe the special characteristics that give schools additional
license to regulate student speech always disappear when a school regulates speech that
takes place off campus. The school’s regulatory interests remain significant in some offcampus circumstances.”).
248. Id. at 2048 (“Although we do not agree with the reasoning of the Third Circuit’s
panel majority, for the reasons expressed above, resembling those of the panel’s
concurring opinion, we nonetheless agree that the school violated B. L.’s First
Amendment rights. The judgment of the Third Circuit is therefore affirmed.”).
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environment.” One such characteristic, which we have stressed, is
the fact that schools at times stand in loco parentis, i.e., in the place
of parents.249
This Court has previously outlined three specific categories of
student speech that schools may regulate in certain circumstances:
(1) “indecent,” “lewd,” or “vulgar” speech uttered during a school
assembly on school grounds; (2) speech uttered during a class trip
that promotes “illegal drug use,”; and (3) speech that others may
reasonably perceive as “bear[ing] the imprimatur of the school,” such
as that appearing in a school-sponsored newspaper.250

The Court also recognized that the examples from prior Supreme
Court decisions did not necessarily reflect the broader and more
complex sets of facts facing lower courts and school districts that were
parties to those cases.251 The examples in the opinion included:
[S]erious or severe bullying or harassment targeting particular
individuals; threats aimed at teachers or other students; the failure
to follow rules concerning lessons, the writing of papers, the use of
computers, or participation in other online school activities; and
breaches of school security devices, including material maintained
within school computers.252

The Supreme Court did not directly address these examples. By
listing them, however, it encouraged—or at least permitted—lower
courts to continue using prior opinions to reach problematic behavior in
these situations. To help the lower courts, the Supreme Court instead
provided three guidelines to help shape future decisions by schools and
courts:
First, a school, in relation to off-campus speech, will rarely stand in
loco parentis. The doctrine of in loco parentis treats school
administrators as standing in the place of students’ parents under
circumstances where the children’s actual parents cannot protect,
guide, and discipline them. Geographically speaking, off-campus
speech will normally fall within the zone of parental, rather than
school-related, responsibility.
Second, from the student speaker’s perspective, regulations of offcampus speech, when coupled with regulations of on-campus speech,

249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 2044–45 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S., at 506; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266).
Id. at 2045 (citing Frederick, 551 U.S. at 409; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271).
Id. at 2045.
Id.
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include all the speech a student utters during the full 24-hour day.
That means courts must be more skeptical of a school’s efforts to
regulate off-campus speech, for doing so may mean the student
cannot engage in that kind of speech at all. When it comes to political
or religious speech that occurs outside school or a school program or
activity, the school will have a heavy burden to justify intervention.
Third, the school itself has an interest in protecting a student’s
unpopular expression, especially when the expression takes place off
campus. America’s public schools are the nurseries of democracy. Our
representative democracy only works if we protect the “marketplace
of ideas.” This free exchange facilitates an informed public opinion,
which, when transmitted to lawmakers, helps produce laws that
reflect the People’s will. That protection must include the protection
of unpopular ideas, for popular ideas have less need for protection.
Thus, schools have a strong interest in ensuring that future
generations understand the workings in practice of the well-known
aphorism, “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the
death your right to say it.”253

The decision in B.L. is consistent with prior jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court has often expressed the “view that the education of the
Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and
state and local school officials, and not of federal judges.”254 The most
recent decision on off-campus speech and student discipline, therefore,
reversed the trend since Tinker moved away from parental authority in
favor of school authority.255 With the new guidelines, the Court has
rebalanced its jurisprudence to give Tinker far more weight.256
Schools retain the power to maintain decorum, control curriculum,
and protect the welfare of their students, particularly in situations of
harassment and bullying that often occur in junior high school and high
school settings. As noted earlier, there are no federal programs to
support school districts in addressing the more structural problems of
bullying, harassment, or other forms of school discipline problems that
occur when teens are in serious trouble.
Schools, however, have another problem when they become the
alternative to parental control. Significant scholarship highlights that
the discipline meted out by school districts are vastly different for

253. Id. at 2046. The opinion explains the attribution of the last quote in the section as
follows: Although this quote is often attributed to Voltaire, it was likely coined by an
English writer, Evelyn Beatrice Hall.
254. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273.
255. See Mahoney, 141 S. Ct. at 2038.
256. Id.
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minority students than Caucasian students.257 “Black students in the
United States are subject to disciplinary action at rates much higher
than their white counterparts. These disciplinary actions put students
at higher risk for negative life outcomes, including involvement in the
criminal justice system.”258 While just 3.5% of white students received
out-of-school suspensions as punishments, 13.46% of Black students
received such a punishment.259 Although school arrests are much less
frequent, Black students are arrested nearly three and a half times
more often than white students.260 The differences have been
statistically linked to systemic implicit bias and exacerbated by
economic effects.261 Another report provides that “[b]lack students are
three times more likely to be suspended or expelled than white
students, according to the Education Department’s Office for Civil
Rights, and research in Texas found students who have been suspended
are more likely to be held back a grade and drop out of school
entirely.”262
Schools should be able to protect students from the aggressive
conduct of other students. Schools are obligated to keep students safe
while educating them and developing their potential. But the Supreme
Court was correct to suggest that school districts should play a less
important role rather than becoming the disciplinarians for society. The
Supreme Court provided useful guidance on that question, but it did not
address the resources needed to empower schools to make a difference.
B. Making Victims into Criminals Is Not the Answer
Another strategy that has been tried is to use strict enforcement of
existing criminal laws to address problems of adolescent behavior. This
strategy is reflected in the prior discussion of school incarcerations that
are often directed at Black male teens.263 Many other jurisdictions have
expanded laws to prohibit the distribution or transmission of sexual
content. Congress enacted the federal Prosecutorial Remedies and

257. Travis Riddle & Stacey Sinclair, Racial Disparities in School-Based Disciplinary
Actions are Associated with County-Level Rates of Racial Bias, 116 PNAS 8255 (Apr. 2,
2019), www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1808307116 (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
258. Id. at 8256.
259. Id.
260. Id. Black students experienced student arrests at the rate of 0.28% compared to
white students who experienced the rate at 0.08%.
261. Id.
262. Libby Nelson & Dara Lind, The School to Prison Pipeline, Explained, VOX (Feb.
24, 2015), http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/8775 (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
263. See id.
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Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT)
Act,264 to strengthen anti-child-pornography remedies and heighten
criminalization for pandering and solicitation.265 State and federal
authorities have “broad authority to proscribe child pornography.”266
Nonetheless, that authority is not unlimited. For example,
non-obscene pornography involving models who are over eighteen but
look younger, computer-generated virtual images of young children, and
artwork depicting minors are all protected speech.267 The prohibition
against child pornography does not apply in these examples because a
minor does not participate in creating such works.268 In contrast, even if
one of the parties in a potential transaction does not involve actual
child pornography, such as an undercover police officer, the specific
intent to distribute or obtain child pornography at the heart of the
transaction is sufficient to allow for a conviction.269
While the PROTECT Act provides law enforcement officers with
additional tools to prosecute predators and pedophiles, it is sufficiently
broad to cover a sexting conversation between two consenting minors.
But, because the law gives these minors both First Amendment rights
and the right to contraceptives and abortion, it does not seem
appropriate to apply a five-year mandatory criminal sentence to the use
of technology like texting. Teen nudity can trigger the consequences of
significant prison time and registration as a sex offender. In one
example, “[a] 15-year-old Ohio girl faces felony charges and may have to
register as a sex offender for allegedly taking nude photos of herself and
sending them to her high school classmates.”270
There are much better ways to address these problems. Louisiana,
for example, prohibits “[t]he transmission, delivery or utterance of any
textual, visual, written, or oral communication depicting lewd or
lascivious conduct, text, words, or images to any person reasonably
believed to be under the age of seventeen and reasonably believed to be

264. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2018).
265. U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
266. Id. at 289.
267. Id.
268. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249–51, 254 (2002) (childprotection rationale for speech restriction does not apply to materials produced without
children).
269. Williams, 553 U.S. at 296 (“The defendant must ‘intend’ that the listener believe
the material to be child pornography, and must select a manner of ‘advertising,
promoting, presenting, distributing, or soliciting’ the material that he thinks will
engender that belief—whether or not a reasonable person would think the same.”).
270. Scott Michels, Teen Charged with Sending Nude Pics of Herself, ABC NEWS (Oct.
9, 2008), https://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5995084&page=1.
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at least two years younger than the offender.”271 To make the
communication qualify as indecent behavior with juveniles, the offender
must send the content “with the intention of arousing or gratifying the
sexual desires of either person.”272 A law such as this is primarily
designed to stop sexting and sexual harassment related to pedophilia.
The exemption from the law for the age gap to be more than two years
removes many of the concerns that the law could be used to punish
consensual communications among classmates.
Protecting the constitutional rights of adolescents who send sexual
images to their partners would still make the redistribution of images a
crime, such as this example: “A 17-year-old in Wisconsin was charged in
May with child pornography for allegedly posting naked pictures of his
ex-girlfriend on the Internet. The girl had sent him the pictures. He told
the La Crosse County Sheriff’s Department he was just ‘venting’ after
she broke up with him.”273 Unlike the situation in which the adolescents
are retaining the images as part of their own, private intimate
activities, this example of “revenge porn” is intended to shame the
subject of the image and is distributed to strangers, including adults.
The distinction is an important one. All individuals, including
adolescents, have both a speech right to express themselves and their
bodies, as well as a privacy interest that should ensure the exposure of
one’s nudity is not undertaken without express permission.
Taken in this light, the limitation on law enforcement suggested here
should not interfere with the ongoing efforts to stop nonconsensual
publication of nude and sexually explicit content. More than forty-six
states plus the District of Columbia have enacted statutes designed to
stop the practice of revenge porn and sexploitation.274 All jurisdictions
should provide such protections.
The narrow limit suggested on child pornography laws is intended to
protect the minors who are often victims of those pictures being
distributed without their permission. Any retransmission beyond the
individual or the consenting couple, if the images involve sex acts, can
and should still fall within the strong prohibitions against child
pornography. But, in many of these cases, a young woman takes her
own photo only to have her sexual partner or a third party distribute

271. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:81 (2020).
272. Id.
273. Michels, supra note 270.
274. Ruobing Su, Tom Porter, & Michelle Mark, Here’s a Map Showing Which US
States Have Passed Laws Against Revenge Porn—And Those Where It’s Still Legal,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/map-states-whererevenge-porn-banned-2019-10.
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that picture. She is the victim of that image being distributed; she is not
a sexual predator. She should be constitutionally protected from
prosecution for child pornography.
VI. MODERN SOLUTIONS THAT MATCH TEENS’ REALITY
This Article highlights that the balance between free speech and
privacy has been difficult for U.S. courts and intractable when dealing
with minors. The tension inherent in the triangle between teens,
parents, and state authorities to the privacy versus speech dynamic has
left policymakers with wicked problems and few effective solutions. Into
this mix, the predatory nature of social media conglomerates has left
adolescents with heightened anxiety, less autonomy, and a sense of
powerlessness.275
A. Tame Social Media With the Help of its Financial Enablers or
Through Nonprofit Alternatives
The first step is to tame the commercial vendors who put minors’
mental health at risk in search of increased platform utilization.276
“[T]ech companies and designers should offer a range of user-friendly
tools that help parents create age-appropriate environments. They
could also change the design to create an environment that is conducive
to more meaningful conversations and less browsing and liking.”277 It is
unlikely that these requests will occur because the companies are
suddenly beneficent or altruistic. On the other hand, it is in advertisers’
best interests to see that their ads and products are linked to socially
beneficial platforms.278 The Forbes Business Council framed the
concern by asking the simple question: “Where is the warning label?”279

275. See Henry Fersko, Is Social Media Bad for Teens’ Mental Health?, UNICEF (Oct.
9, 2018), https://www.unicef.org/stories/social-media-bad-teens-mental-health.
It is no secret that social media platforms were deliberately designed to hold
users’ attention as long as possible, tapping into psychological biases and
vulnerabilities relating to our desire for validation and fear of rejection. Too
much passive use of social media–just browsing posts–can be unhealthy and
has been linked to feelings of envy, inadequacy and less satisfaction with life.
Studies have even suggested that it can lead to ADHD symptoms, depression,
anxiety and sleep deprivation.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See Ines Schulze Horn, et al., Business Reputation and Social Media: A Primer on
Threats and Responses, 16 JOURNAL OF DIRECT, DATA AND DIGITAL MARKETING PRACTICE
193 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1057/dddmp.2015.1.
279. Patrick Bensen, The Warning Sign: How Social Media Companies Can Address
Social
Responsibility,
FORBES
(Apr.
16,
2021),
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The public saw a brief glimpse of the power of other businesses in the
social media supply chain to impact content when OnlyFans announced
it was planning to ban pornography from its service.280 OnlyFans is a
social media platform where content producers can post their original
content in exchange for payment through subscriptions or tips.281 Once
a site dedicated to musicians and do-it-yourselfers, COVID changed the
market. “The popularity of the social-media service exploded during the
pandemic as sex workers, musicians and online influencers used it to
charge fans for exclusive access to photos, videos, and other material.
OnlyFans has attracted more than 130 million users.”282 The company
then announced that due to mounting pressure from banks and
payment providers, it would bar subscribers’ adult content.283
A week later, this particular decision was reversed as the company
announced it had received assurances from those banking and financial
partners that the posting policies would remain unchanged.284 In a
rather startling reversal of public attitudes towards online content,
OnlyFans’ adult platform was seen as a safe haven for professional sex
workers and others who turned to adult content because they could not
work due to the pandemic.285
Among the lessons from the OnlyFans abortive announcement was
the clear power that banks, financial companies, large advertisers, and
other commercial enterprises have on social media platforms. If the
world’s professional and collegiate sports regulators, for example,
restricted their content to those platforms that operated with a code of
conduct that protected adolescents, then the behaviors of the platforms
could quickly be held to a new standard.
An even more effective alternative at establishing new norms for the
social media companies would be for a nonprofit conglomerate to
provide an alternative to the predatory and profit-motivated solutions

https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinesscouncil/2021/04/16/the-warning-sign-howsocial-media-companies-can-address-social-responsibility/?sh=5e0b0e2a13b4.
280. See Ryan Browne, OnlyFans Says It Will No Longer Ban Porn in Stunning UTurn
After
User
Backlash,
CNBC
(Aug.
25,
2021)
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/25/onlyfans-says-it-will-no-longer-ban-porn-after-backlashfrom-users.html.
281. See How It Works, ONLYFANS, https://onlyfans.com/how (last visited Jan. 25,
2022).
282. Lucas Shaw, OnlyFans to Bar Sexually Explicit Videos Starting in October,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0819/onlyfans-to-block-sexually-explicit-videos-starting-in-october.
283. Id.
284. See Browne, supra note 280.
285. Id.
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presently on the market. Nonprofits such as Khan Academy, Edutopia,
Wikipedia, Mozilla and others have provided tremendous social benefit
to society through their services. National Public Radio and the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting have delivered high-quality
educational news and entertainment for decades. In addition, the
nation’s 4,000 colleges regularly generate original scholarship, training,
and educational materials for their own students and the communities
they serve. With these socially beneficial resources and rich content, a
well-designed consortium could supplant the market-driven companies
with content and content-moderation tools that would provide more
control for the user and less incentive to pull the user into destructive
compulsive behaviors. The for-profit sector could certainly choose to do
this as well, but the metrics for economic success in Silicon Valley
militate against such a for-profit, remaining true to its long-term
goals.286
B. Adopt “Empathy by Design” for Adolescent-Serving Institutions
A new approach is needed to make online platforms and adolescentserving institutions healthier and more supportive for the teens they
serve. One approach can be borrowed from the human-centered design
approach promoted by IDEO287 and the Institute of Design at
Stanford.288 At the heart of these efforts is the use of empathy to begin
the design process:
Empathy is the centerpiece of a human-centered design process. The
Empathize mode is the work you do to understand people . . . . It is
your eﬀort to understand the way they do things and why, their

286. See e.g., Jon M. Garon, Searching Inside Google: Cases, Controversies, and the
Future of the World’s Most Provocative Company, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 429 (2010)
(discussing the evolution of a company that once had “don’t be evil” as its motto).
287. Jason Weeby, Creating More Effective, Efficient, and Equitable Education Policies
with
Human-Centered
Design,
BELLWETHER EDUCATION PARTNERS
(2018),
https://bellwethereducation.org/publication/creating-more-effective-efficient-andequitable-education-policies-human-centered-design (“The history of human-centered
design reaches back to the 1960s, but its popularization began in the 1990s with the
creation of IDEO, one of the most well-known design firms in the world.”).
288. See An Introduction to Design Thinking Process Guide, Institute of Design at
Stanford,
STANFORD
UNIVERSITY,
https://web.stanford.edu/~mshanks/MichaelShanks/files/509554.pdf (last visited Jan. 26,
2022); Dennis Hambeukers, Visualizing the Essence of Design Thinking in a Diagram,
Part
2,
SERVICE
DESIGN
NOTEBOOK
(Oct.
6,
2015),
https://servicedesignnotebook.nl/visualizing-the-essence-of-design-thinking-in-a-diagrampart-2-62b7559f0e10.
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physical and emotional needs, how they think about world, and what
is meaningful to them.289

Applying human-centered design to teen services is not entirely new.
“[H]uman-centered design in the education sector tends to focus on the
creation of products, services, and experiences. It has been used to
create curriculum, learning spaces, apps, lunchtime, and even entire
school systems.”290 At the same time, the actual use of this approach
has been relatively rare.291
Among the many challenges institutions face designing solutions for
children is the tendency to overgeneralize. The empathy-by-design
approach must be informed by starting with the individual student
rather than groups or populations. This lesson derives from the
foundational need to develop youth programs featuring age-appropriate
child development strategies and effective teaching strategies and
human rights principles.292
Although this Article uses the label of “empathy-by-design,” there are
many others. Writing for Save the Children, Dr. Joan Durrant uses the
term “positive discipline” to reflect many of these same underlying
concepts. Dr. Durrant explains that positive discipline is based on
“children’s rights to health development, protection from violence and
active participation in their learning.”293 Based on the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child, childrens’ right to participate in decisionmaking includes expressing their opinions and having their opinions
respected; having a say in matters affecting them; having access to
information; and freely associating with other people.294 This right to be
heard and participate is the corollary of the obligation to use empathy
in designing systems that govern student learning, discipline, and
behavior.
Program developers and planners have had consistent success when
they step into the shoes of the students they plan to serve before
designing systems on their behalf.295 A study of university advising, for

289. An Introduction to Design Thinking Process Guide, Institute of Design at
Stanford, infra note 304, at 2.
290. Weeby, supra note 287, at 14.
291. Id.
292. Joan E. Durrant, Positive Discipline in Everyday Teaching, SAVE THE CHILDREN
(2010),
https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/library/what-positive-disciplinepositive-discipline-everyday-teaching (last visited Jan. 27, 2022).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. There are multiple psychological definitions of empathy, including Adam Smith’s
explanation that empathy is “imagining how one would think and feel in another person’s
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example, found that effective advising was responsible for increasing
graduation rates, reducing the number of semesters needed for students
to complete college (which reduced student cost), and decreasing
withdrawals from college.296 A recent study showed the same thing is
true when high schools provide effective student counseling.297 These
strategies directly impacted the reduction of racial and ethnic
disparities in graduation rates.298
Teens need a different system to address their privacy needs, their
free speech interests, and supplement the parents’ roles beyond the
school systems. Courts are serving as an in loco parentis alternative in
the case of pregnancy, but there is no real national resource for
adolescents seeking the broader range of services that they might need
if they cannot get them outside the household. “[T]oday’s world has
become increasingly complex, technical, and multicultural, placing new
and challenging demands on young people in terms of education,
training, and the social and emotional skills needed in a highly
competitive environment.”299
By looking at the wide range of teen rights and limits, a coalition of
nonprofits could become the foundation for a comprehensive social
support initiative. Given that almost all court decisions on judicial
bypass provide consent for the young pregnant woman to get an
abortion, these agencies might also be designated as surrogates to
arrange this permission. As part of that role, the young woman would
situation,” intuiting or projecting oneself into another’s situation, and a variety of related
concepts for cognitive empathy, emotional recognition, and many others. See C. Daniel
Batson, These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct Phenomena, SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY (2009). See also Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Deeply Contacting
the Inner World of Another: Practicing Empathy in Values-Based Negotiation Role Plays,
39 WASH. U. J.L. & POLICY 189, 194–95 (2012) (“Sometimes, the same word—empathy—is
used to talk about different things (cognitive understanding vs. emotional connection and
resonance). At other times, referring to what may be the same phenomenon, we use
different words (‘empathy’ vs. ‘recognition’).”).
296. See Allison Bailey, et. al., Turning More Tassels, BCC & SASPA,
https://success.gsu.edu/download/turningmoretassels/?wpdmdl=6472357&refresh=61449d80523b01631886720 (last visited Jan. 26,
2022).
297. Christine Mulhern, Better School Counselors, Better Outcomes, 21 EDUCATION
NEXT
(Fall
2021),
https://www.educationnext.org/better-school-counselors-betteroutcomes-quality-varies-can-matter-as-much-as-with-teachers/
(effective
counselors
improved high school graduation rates, attendance at four-year colleges, and persistence
at those colleges into second year) (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
298. See id. (“These impacts are generally larger for students who are not white,
scored below average on the state test in 8th grade, or are from low-income families.”);
Turning More Tassels, supra note 296.
299. Community Programs to Promote Youth Development, supra note 4, at 2.
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be provided with additional social services that a judge does not
provide.
In 2002, the National Academy of Science embraced this approach,
promoting “a broader, more holistic view of helping youth to realize
their full potential is gaining wider credence in the world of policy and
practice.”300 The 2002 report, however, did not anticipate the influence
of social media, cell phones, and much of the technology that now
mediates the adolescent’s online experience. In its conclusion, the report
noted that “[a] combination of factors have weakened the informal
community support once available to young people.”301
There are many skills and coping strategies needed for adolescents to
develop and thrive in the current environment.302 In the area of online
privacy, these organizations could work with teens to help prevent
bullying and harassment, but they could also be trained to provide
services to the teens who are victims of such abuse. Notably, these are
not always distinct categories. Those who are bullied have also been
known to bully others. Moreover, as discussed below, empathy training
can help reduce antisocial behavior and improve coping skills. By
serving as advocates and supporters, rather than disciplinarians, for
the teens, these social service agencies could provide the mental health
referrals and other resources to keep the teens who are victims of online
abuse from spiraling into depression, self-harm, or suicide.
Many agencies already provide a range of social services to teens,
including YMCA, Urban League, JCC, 4H, and municipal community
centers. What is missing is a national program addressing the vastly
changed norms of growing up with a cell phone in one hand and social
media watching every step one takes. Teens have more rights than ever
before, but they do not have the resources to address the modern world.
Schools are ill-equipped to help. And, for too many adolescents, their
parents cannot provide them with the support they need.
Such programs could also provide the alternative to schools and
courts as the source for conflict resolution involving some of the
bullying and harassment activities that occur online and adjacent to
school environments. If such programs proved effective over time, those
organizations could also collaborate with the major social media

300. Community Programs to Promote Youth Development, supra note 4, at 3.
301. Community Programs to Promote Youth Development, supra note 4, at 297.
302. See GARON, supra note 131, at 76–80 (discussing information literacy, digital
literacy, privacy, and security literacy, as well as “the attributes essential to build lives of
meaning and fulfillment.”); see also Community Programs to Promote Youth Development,
supra note 4, at 301 (discussing settings providing physical and psychological security,
emotional support, opportunities to develop relationships, and other similar attributes).
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platforms. In such an arrangement, the victim of online bullying could
inform the nonprofit social service organization. It would have a
“preferred status” to red flag harmful content and conduct, alerting the
social media platforms of such content that singled out individuals,
violated the terms of service for these platform providers, and helping
assure an expeditious removal of the content which violated the
community norms of the platforms.
Responsible social media hosts should be expected to welcome the
help if it can be established that these organizations can make informed
decisions balancing the speech interests of their teen participants and
the need for their teen participants to be free from harassment,
bullying, and stalking. Although voluntary, this approach is much more
intentional and supportive than the current model. If combined with
conflict-resolution programs and similar tools, these programs—run by
the premiere network of existing social service agencies—could make a
significant difference in the lives of countless teens.
C. Expand Restorative Justice Strategies
Additional benefits will be found by expanding efforts to utilize
restorative justice or restorative practice strategies in many areas
involving adolescent discipline, particularly those that fall into the gray
area between parental authority and institutional authority.303 For
teens, these restorative practices may be summarized as “a
transformative force that addresses healing and accountability at
personal and structural levels of society, and . . . a tool to address
interpersonal harm . . . .”304 “Research has established a myriad of

303. See Thalia González, The Legalization of Restorative Justice: A Fifty-State
Empirical Analysis, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 1027, 1035 (2019) (“In the education system,
restorative justice requires ‘a philosophical and practical shift away from punitive and
retributive control mechanisms . . . to prioritize individual and community growth to
support safe and healthy school culture.’”) (quoting Thalia González, Restorative Justice
from the Margins to the Center: The Emergence of a New Norm in School Discipline, 60
HOW. L.J. 267, 270–71 (2016)).
304. Carl Stauffer & Sonya Shah, Restorative Justice: Taking the Pulse of a Movement
19 (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Zehr Institute for Restorative Justice),
http://zehr-institute.org/publications/docs/introduction.pdf [https://perma.cc/T42Z-XL6Q].
See also Vogel, infra note 311, at 572 (“Restorative justice requires, at a minimum, that
we address victims’ harms and needs, hold offenders accountable to put right those
harms, and involve victims, offenders, and communities in this process.”) (quoting
HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, 1, 25 (2002)).
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benefits that flow from nonpunitive approaches utilizing restorative
justice concepts and other holistic approaches.”305
Restorative justice [(RJ)] has its origins in indigenous
communities . . . . For First Nations people, the Navajo, and other native
people, this worldview has been a way of being that prioritizes
relationships, interdependency, fairness, shared decision making,
solidarity, and healing. Although Western iterations of RJ emerged
initially as an alternative approach to responding to harm and crime,
schools are returning to the historical roots of RJ, with people
adopting a more holistic framing and recognizing the importance of
living well together in communities.306

Like positive discipline and empathy by design, restorative justice
education is predicated on an empathetic, holistic model of engagement,
dignity, and mutual respect.307 It is initially thought of as a system for
criminal or tortfeasor accountability, but the role of restorative justice
applies more appropriately as a method of conflict resolution, applicable
whether or not prior conduct has resulted in some community members
taking criminal or otherwise antisocial action.308 “School-based
practices that (a) center healthy relationships, (b) work to heal harms
and transform conflict, and (c) advocate for justice and equity include
both preventative and responsive practices.”309 Each of these three goals
is an essential component of community building. Professor Marie
Failinger has written that restorative justice practices can help support
unwed teen mothers.310 In her work, she outlines five critical
components for understanding the model:

305. Khin Mai Aung, Pitting Our Youth Against Each Other: Moving School
Harassment and Bullying Policy from A Zero Tolerance Discipline to Safe School
Environment Framework, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 885, 897 (2013).
306. Anne Gregory and Katherine R. Evans, The Starts and Stumbles of Restorative
Justice in Education: Where do We Go from Here?, NAT. ED. POLICY CENTER (Jan. 2020),
http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/restorative-justice (internal citations omitted) (last
visited Jan. 26, 2022).
307. Id.
308. Brian Littlechild and Helen Sender, The Introduction of Restorative Justice
Approaches in Young People’s Residential Units: A Critical Evaluation, Centre for
Community Research, U. HERTFORDSHIRE (Feb. 2010), www.nspcc.org.uk/inform (“The
conflict resolution and restorative approaches outlined in this report can be an effective
way of dealing with criminal behaviour for both victims and perpetrators, as well as for
developing positive social and interpersonal attitudes within residential units.”) (last
visited Jan. 26, 2022).
309. Gregory & Evans, supra note 306, at 8.
310. Marie A. Failinger, Ophelia with Child: A Restorative Approach to Legal DecisionMaking by Teen Mothers, 28 L. & INEQUAL. 255, 278–80 (2010).
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[T]he restorative justice movement has re-imagined the nature of the
individual’s relationship to the state in five important ways . . . .
First, the restorative movement recognizes the reality and value of
interdependence, and makes legally visible those relationships with
family, friends, and community that exercise dynamic and interactive
influences on the subject of government intervention . . . . [T]he
restorative movement recognizes that in each moment, the individual
is acting on and being acted upon by others related to him or her, and
that these relationships constitute the warp and woof of the
individual’s capacity to make successful choices.
Second, the restorative . . . planners understand that human beings
often make choices that undermine their well-being for a variety of
reasons, ranging from confusion about what is in their best interests,
to impulsivity, to a sense of worthlessness and hopelessness.
Restorative planners bring the community in to surround offenders
for a long-term process expected to confront behavioral reverses.
Third, the restorative movement demands accountability
harmed, both those who suffer immediate injuries from the
actions and those whose community is more indirectly
because of the fear, anger, or other emotions caused by the
conduct . . .

to others
offender’s
impaired
offender’s

Fourth, accountability for change is reflexive in the restorative
model—not only is the offender accountable to those closest to him or
her, but the community is accountable for “seeing” the offender as a
whole person with strengths as well as flaws, without excusing or
ignoring the offender’s blame for his or her condition . . .
Fifth, restorative justice is built on reality-tested hope. As Professor
Howard Vogel has described it, restorative justice is “rooted in a
wager about the nature of reality and the human condition,”
specifically that every person wants to create positive connections
with others and, in a “safe space,” we can “take action through
dialogue to build community so that all life might flourish.”311

Restorative justice’s emphasis on all stakeholders helps the minor,
the minor’s parents, and the institutions continue to stress within their
triangular dynamic. “Restorative justice enhances social and emotional
intelligence—the ability to identify and navigate emotions within
oneself and with others. It also sensitizes participants to the value of
311. Id. (quoting Howard J. Vogel, The Restorative Justice Wager: The Promise and
Hope of a Value-Based, Dialogue-Driven Approach to Conflict Resolution for Social
Healing, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 565 (2007)).
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relationships within and between social groups, and it strives to teach
responsibility, accountability, honesty, empathy, and the satisfactions
provided by work.”312
To bring restorative justice into school systems, community centers,
judicial diversionary programs, and other realms where such tensions
exist, the participants facilitating the restorative practices must not
lose sight of the five values identified by Professor Failinger. Empathy
and respect for each participant, beginning with the minor at the center
of the process, remains essential for the program to work. Facilitators
need sufficient training and experience to deliver these outcomes, often
needing to educate the participants as a component of providing the
service. In practice, this means “restorative justice in schools is playing
a positive role, but schools must work hard to avoid the pitfalls that can
blunt the programs’ impact—usually the result of faulty design and
implementation.”313
It must also be recognized that restorative justice and empathy by
design are necessary but not sufficient. “Despite the laudable goals of
school reform measures such Restorative Justice and Positive
Behavioral Interventions and Supports, all of these efforts will not yield
systemic reform without addressing implicit bias.”314 Conflict resolution
strategies will necessarily fall short where racial bias and inequitable
processes or programs exist at the core of the conflict. Again, starting
with the empathy-by-design approach may help identify some of these
structural barriers to unequal treatment. By combining these
principles, conflicts can be minimized while structural changes can be
implemented.
Restorative justice practices can even be explored for online
communities. Again, the core values of the restorative practice model
are relationships, interdependency, shared decision making, and a
community spirit, which are often found in the rhetoric of social media
platforms but rarely in their algorithmic design. Changing the goals of
social media platforms to match community-based, collaborative, and
healthy interactive networks would facilitate a positive change in
312. Lisa Abregú, Restorative Justice in Schools: Restoring Relationships and Building
Community, 18 DIS. RES. MAG. 10, 11 (Summer 2012).
313. Tim Walker, Restorative Practices in Schools Work . . . But They Can Work Better,
NEA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.nea.org/advocating-for-change/new-fromnea/restorative-practices-schools-work-they-can-work-better (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
314. Laura R. McNeal, Managing Our Blind Spot: The Role of Bias in the School-toPrison Pipeline, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 285, 298 (2016) (citing Khin Mai Aung, Pitting Our
Youth Against Each Other: Moving School Harassment and Bullying Policy from a Zero
Tolerance Discipline to Safe School Environment Framework, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 885,
897–98 (2013)).
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minors’ online experiences, promoting the best technology has to offer
while mitigating the known harms. Restorative justice provides a
philosophical roadmap that dovetails with the empathy-first model of
human-centered design and hopefully captures in the empathy-bydesign model for system interactions.
D. Teach the Skills and Substance of Empathy
Empathy permeates the heart of restorative justice, requiring both
empathies by the perpetrator of antisocial acts towards the victims of
those acts as well as by those victims towards the perpetrator.315
“Empathy is a critical element of the restorative justice process.”316 But,
empathy is not easy and should not be presumed readily available from
all perpetrators of antisocial activities, nor from all victims of those
behaviors. Even outside the restorative justice framework, it is asking
quite a bit to simply expect that all community members are empathetic
to the plight of those around them. Empathy requires:
[S]tanding in another person’s shoes to feel and think as they do.
Empathy must then be followed by a desire to reduce the other’s
suffering, a desire that must be sufficiently intense to prod you into
suffering-reducing action. But empathy requires imagination, and
the suffering-alleviation urge turns on social norms that dictate when
we should feel and then act on certain emotions.317

Rather than calling for the implementation of empathetic strategies
in the context of criminal behavior or antisocial conflict in schools, the
empathy-by-design approach requires that empathy is viewed as a
building block to create healthy schools and communities to lessen the
likelihood of conflict and address those conflicts once they occur. To do
this, the schools and institutions that serve teens need to invest their
resources to value empathy as more than an abstract ideal. These
schools and institutions need to teach about the importance of empathy,
train students to be more empathetic, and model empathetic
315. Renee Warden, Where Is the Empathy? Understanding Offenders’ Experience of
Empathy and Its Impact on Restorative Justice, 87 UMKC L. REV. 953, 957 (2019)
(“Empathy is an essential component of offenders’ respect for the law and rights of others.
It also has the potential to explain and to heal what is broken in offenders’ relationships
to society.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, In General, Should Excuses Be Complete or Partial?: Why
Did Tinkerbell Get off So Easy?: The Roles of Imagination and Social Norms in Excusing
Human Weakness, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 420 (2009).
316. Amanda Cooper, A Case for Diversionary Restorative Justice in Cases Involving
the Embezzlement of Funds from Small Businesses, 22 CARDOZO J. CONFL. RES. 627, 643
(2021).
317. Taslitz, supra note 315, at 420.
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experiences in age-appropriate pedagogies.318 The goal with these
programs should be to increase the student’s “empathetic accuracy,”
meaning the “extent to which such everyday mind reading attempts are
successful.”319
Empathic accuracy first requires
‘[e]mpathic
inference,’ . . . the everyday mind reading that people do whenever they
attempt to infer other people’s thoughts and feelings.”320
Studies show that the efforts to develop empathetic accuracy can pay
dividends: “Studies relating empathy to such prosocial behaviors as
cooperation, sharing, donating, and other altruistic acts have generally
yielded positive ﬁndings, especially in adults.”321 The data are less clear
for children because of the wide variety of tests and measures used.
Nonetheless, “[i]nvestigations that have addressed the relationship in
children between empathy and cooperation and studies entailing the
training of empathy have yielded more consistent positive outcomes.”322
The research supports findings of a reduction in social prejudice and
aggression while increasing academic achievement and emotional
intelligence.323 Other studies in primary education have produced
similar, positive outcomes.324 For example, in a study conducted
amongst fifth-grade South Korean students, empathy-based learning
was used in the student’s social studies classes. The results produced
statistically significant changes in behavior and attitudes as well as
garnering positive feedback from the students.325

318. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 295, at 189.
Teachers of law are preparing students to be peacemakers—or, at least, to
facilitate peace by helping clients resolve conflict in particular ways. I have
come to believe that if we take this peacemaking business seriously, our job as
legal educators is not only to teach students the doctrine, theory, and practical
skills associated with lawyering, but also to . . . nurture of their growth not
only intellectually, but also socially, emotionally, and (dare I say it) morally.
319. William Ickes, Empathic Accuracy: Its Links to Clinical, Cognitive,
Developmental, Social, and Physiological Psychology, SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF
EMPATHY, 1, 57 (2009).
320. Id.
321. Norma Deitch Feshbach & Seymour Feshbach, Empathy and Education, SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, 1, 85 (2009).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 86–88.
324. See, e.g., June Lee, Yunoug Lee, & Mi Hwa Kim, Effects of Empathy-Based
Learning in Elementary Social Studies, ASIA-PACIFIC EDU RES 510 (2018),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40299-018-0413-2 (last visited Jan. 27, 2022).
325. Id. at 516–18. “The results showed that empathy-based instruction had stronger
positive effects on students’ empathy and academic engagement than traditional lectureoriented instruction. In addition, the students and teacher in the experimental group
indicated that they were satisﬁed with the empathy-based class and acknowledged the
importance of empathy in the interviews.” Id. at 517.
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Students are much more likely to use empathetic approaches to
problem solving and conflict resolution if they are taught the
importance of these techniques and trained in their use throughout
their education than if they are required only when the students are in
crisis. Although untested, it is reasonable to predict that students’
online aggressiveness and bullying behavior would be reduced if they
had been trained previously to be empathetic towards others and reflect
on the negative consequences of bullying posts before making them.
Comprehensive training could well prove the missing element to
make restorative practices easier to adopt and administer and to
reverse the negative trends for minors in their online experiences.
Reinforcing the importance of empathy could then be built into
community messaging surrounding online activities, and eventually be
built directly into the social media filters themselves.326 The work has
already begun. “Cutting-edge companies are layering AI techniques
such as clustering, feature extraction and natural language processing
on top of more traditional algorithmic approaches to gain intelligent,
prescriptive and empathetic insights that can be rapidly understood
and used by business and technical users.”327
A combination of empathy-by-design pedagogy and technology can
make a difference for minors, enabling a future that is less fraught with
anxiety and better designed to support empathetic and caring
communities. But, if schools and institutions do not embrace empathyby-design, then the experiences for minors will continue to make mental
health worse and increase the size and scale of conflicts at home and
school—conflicts the Supreme Court has largely sidestepped in ruling
on minors’ rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
Social media, the Internet, cell phones, and the always-on,
interconnected world have fundamentally changed the nature of
adolescence. Parents remain the primary authority for raising children,
but many children have only one parent at home, and some have none.
Teens struggle with online bullying, mental health issues, and the
challenges of becoming adults in a world much different than the one in
which their parents grew up.
Adolescents do have constitutional rights, including the right to
privacy and the rights protected by the First Amendment. Society,
326. See, e.g., Agata Bugaj, Using AI to Drive Human Empathy at Machine Scale, AI
AUTHORITY TECH. INSIGHTS (Mar. 23, 2021), https://aithority.com/machine-learning/usingai-to-drive-human-empathy-at-machine-scale/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
327. Id.
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however, sends very mixed signals on how those rights should be
understood and protected. Lessons from Supreme Court decisions on
contraceptives and abortion services provide some insight into the
extent of those rights. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mahanoy
Area School District v. B.L. has shed further light on the powers school
districts possess to provide discipline.
But none of these constitutional frameworks help address the
fundamental need to support and supplement the family with
constructive and proactive services for teens, particularly those in
trouble. Such services may help narrow the racial gap and reduce the
disproportionate burden that young women and LGBTQ+ teens face.
Constitutional rights do not necessarily lead to statutory remedies. The
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence suggests that there is a social problem
with which society needs to address. The case law provides us with a
small voice calling out for a new beginning.
There is a strategy available to make a difference for teens, but it
requires rethinking the institutions that serve them. Empathy-bydesign and restorative practices can substantially help provide tools to
manage the conflict in their lives and offer models that reduce the
conflicts from arising. Banks, financial institutions, and large
commercial advertisers can also do their part by putting their resources
behind those platforms that adopt positive mental health strategies and
avoid predatory marketing practices. Together, this global village
comprised of schools, nonprofits, commercial institutions, and
technology companies can reverse the pressure on our minors,
addressing the stresses that have exacerbated mental health problems.
But, if the institutions do nothing, the problem will worsen. No one
institution is uniquely responsible, but each must play its part.
Empathy-by-design provides a blueprint for developing this cooperative
model.
Perhaps, it is time to step into our children’s shoes. Perhaps, with
time, we can learn to listen.

